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Agricultural trade between the United States has been an important feature since they 
each were still colonies. Trade disputes and other tensions in the relationship have also 
been common over a long history. Here we focus on the recent relationship and look to 
the future. We find that despite tensions, the agricultural trade is large and growing; to 
the benefit of economies on both sides of the border. 
. The conflicted nature of this the agricultural trade relationship between Canada and the 
United States is manifest in the continuing series of bilateral trade disputes co-existing 
with, falling trade barriers, growing trade quantities and a generally cooperative approach 
to multilateral agricultural trade issues. The paper attempts to explain the nature of trade 
disputes; identify the causes of trade frictions; explore the commonality of positions in 
the regional and multilateral trade talks; discuss the institutional framework that exists to 
reduce tensions and promote trade cooperation; and suggest ways in which the 
relationship might be improved.  
We begin with an historical perspective on the agricultural trade relations between the 
United States and Canada and then turn to a comparison of the agricultural policies and 
markets in the two countries, which constitute the environment in which the trade 
relations exist. Section 3 discusses the development of bilateral agricultural trade flows 
that has led to or exacerbated trade tensions. We then describe and explain some of the 
more contentious and persistent trade disputes, including tensions in grains, dairy fruits 
and vegetables, meat and live animals, and problems that have occasionally arisen in 
other agricultural industries such as sugar and wine. Institutions for resolving or avoiding 
disputes are outlined and we then consider cooperation in the broader arena of regional 
and multilateral trade relationships. A final section of the paper gives some conclusions 
on ways to enhance the relationship between Canada and the United States and avoid 
allowing agricultural trade tensions to further detract from the benefits of more open 
borders and gains from agricultural trade in North America.  
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1. History of Agricultural Trade Relations 
Canada and the United States share one of the longest and most commercially active 
borders in the world. Each country is the largest trade partner for the other, and flows of 
investment and persons take place with minimal restrictions. This has not always been the 
case, as trade tensions have flared up at various times over the past centuries. Trade 
policy in the United States historically revolved around the need to collect tariff revenue, 
and Canada was not exempt from such taxes. In its early years Canadian trade policy was 
run by the colonial administrations, both French and British, and also revolved around the 
collection of tariff revenue. Canadian policy was perhaps the more dependent on the 
actions of others. Split between cultural and emotional ties to Britain and close 
geographic proximity to the United States, Canada had little choice but to react to 
developments in each of its two dominant trade partners.  
Attempts to facilitate trade across the border between the United States and –Canada are 
almost as old as the countries themselves. Bilateral trade pacts between Canada and the 
United States are a manifestation of these tensions. Table 1.1 shows a timeline for such 
efforts. In 1854, in part as a reaction to the repeal of the Corn Laws in the United 
Kingdom (the start of a period of unilateral trade liberalization by the world’s foremost 
industrial power, at the expense of countries that had enjoyed preferential access) Canada 
sought better access into US markets. The short-lived Elgin-Marcy pact of the mid 
nineteenth century exchanged such access for transit and fishing rights, but Canada raised 
duties against US goods, and lost the support of free-traders in the United States with the 
end of the Civil War. After some further attempts to negotiate trade agreements with the 
United States after Confederation, Canada resorted to more inward-looking policies in the 
latter half of the Century. The United States also increased the protection of its domestic 
market and some took the view that statehood was the desirable solution for Canada. The 
United States did not pursue favoured trade status with an independent neighbour. 
However, the United States itself reduced tariffs in the early years of the 20
th century, and 
by 1911 tariffs were at their lowest levels for decades. Canadian attempts to harmonize 
tariffs and ensure free movement of resource-based products floundered, and Canada 
once again turned to the UK and its prospect of imperial preferences.  
The dramatic increase in the US tariff rates in 1930, with the passage of the Smoot-
Hawley Act, precipitated reactions from both the UK and Canada. The immediate result 
was the introduction of trade preferences into the British market, agreed at the Ottawa 
Imperial Economic Conference in 1932. When the United States passed the Reciprocal 
Trade Act in 1934, offering reduced tariffs for those that would open up their markets to 
US goods, Canada responded. The 1935 Agreement opened the way to better access, 
though still predominantly on terms favourable to the United States. By 1938, attempts 
were made to resolve the ambiguities in Canadian trade policy by a series of trilateral 
trade talks, but world event prevented an agreement. In effect, the GATT, emerging in 
1947 from the preparations for the Havana Conference of 1948, in large part became, for 
Canada, the reconciliation between imperial preferences and the search for a special trade 
relationship with the United States.  
Post-war trade relations between Canada and the United States became closer with 
specific sectoral agreements on automobiles and parts (the Auto Pact) and defence   4 
procurement in 1965, but any hope that these would blossom into a special trade 
relationship were dashed by the policies of the United States in the 1970s and the 
economic instability of the decade. By the mid-1980s Canada felt itself at a greater 
disadvantage than ever it terms of its access to the large US market. Renewed talks 
focused on forging an agreement that would at the least bring some degree of 
predictability to the trade relationship. The Reagan administration expressed strong tied 
to free trade principles, but the negotiation of the Free Trade Area (or CUSTA, as 
Canadian commentators preferred to call it) became more of an exercise in trade 
management than traditional liberalization. When Mexico wanted to have a similar 
special relationship with the United States, Canada joined in the trilateral North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1993 but now found itself sharing its 
newly established preferences (Hart, 2000).  
The significance of regional and multilateral trade agreements in shaping and 
constraining the bilateral relationship has been reinforced in recent years. Canada has 
been a strong proponent of the complementarity of regional and multilateral trade 
agreements, and has supported negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas 
and a stronger free trade agenda for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group, as 
well as NAFTA. While pushing actively in the World Trade Organization (WTO) for 
further trade liberalization, Canada has been a willing partner in such regional 
agreements. Table 1.1 shows the main regional and multilateral agreements that include 
the United States and Canada as well as other trading partners: each of these contributes 
importantly to the institutional framework in which bilateral trade takes place. Both the 
United States and Canada retain their full rights in these broader agreements, to be 
supplemented rather than replaced by bilateral (or trilateral) continental pacts.
1 The 
mutuality or divergence of attitudes toward these multilateral institutions makes up a 
major part of the bilateral trade relationship.  
Agriculture has played an important role in the overall trade relationship between the 
United States and Canada from the start. Natural trade patterns exist on a north-south axis 
across the border, as a result of climatic and other factors, as well as along the east-west 
axis encouraged by the existence of the border. Fish, furs and forest products were 
exports that took advantage of Canada’s vast natural resources, along with mineral 
extraction. Wheat, barley and beef became important farm exports, expanding to include 
fruits and vegetables from the valleys of BC and the Niagara Peninsular. Similar north-
south cross-border trade occurred in the Maritimes and New England. In 2001, total 
merchandise trade (exports plus imports) for the United States was about $1.9 trillion, of 
which about 20 percent was bilateral with Canada. Canada’s total merchandise trade was 
about US$480 billion, of which three quarters is bilateral with the United States (See 
Table 1.2). Agricultural trade makes up a significant part of the trade of each country. 
Total US agricultural trade (exports plus imports) was about $138 billion, of which $32 
billion (23 percent) is bilateral. The bilateral agricultural trade comprises about 65 
                                                 
1 The situation is thus different from that of the European Union, where member states give up the right to 
govern their bilateral trade relations by means of WTO rules as they adopt the more extensive rule-system 
of the EU.    5 
percent of Canada’s total agricultural trade. Canada exports about 22 billion to the United 
States and the United States exports about 10 billion to Canada
2  
Table 1.1: Timeline of Agricultural Trade Agreements involving both Canada and 
the United States 
Year  Agreements 
1854  Elgin-Marcy Reciprocity Agreement between the United States and Canada  
1866  Abrogation (non-renewal) of the Elgin-Marcy Reciprocity Agreement 
1935  Canada-US Reciprocal Trade Agreement  
1947  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
1987  Canada-US Free Trade Agreement signed 
1989  Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA or FTA) implemented 
  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) formed 
1992  North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) signed 
1993  Uruguay Round Negotiations concluded 
1994  North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force 
  Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) launched at Summit of the Americas in Miami 
  United States and Canada signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on grain trade 
1995  World Trade Organization (WTO), including Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), and Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), entered into force 
  MOU on grain trade between United States and Canada expired  
  Federal-provincial Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
1998  Record of Understanding Between the Governments of Canada and the United States of 
America Regarding Areas of Agricultural Trade (ROU) signed 
2001  Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA): Third Summit in Quebec confirms timetable  
Source: Authors, based in part on Hart (2000) 
 
                                                 
2 Details of the coverage of agricultural trade is found in the footnote to Table 1.2.   6 
Table 1.2: Relative importance of agricultural trade in bilateral and total trade of 
goods (Million US Dollars) 
  Imports  Exports  Total Trade           
(Imports + Exports) 
  Bilateral agricultural
1 trade (A) 
Canada  10,103 21,803
2  31,906 
United States  21,803 10,103 31,906 
  Total agricultural trade (B) 
Canada  15,551 33,574 49,124 
United States  68,400 70,017  138,417 
  Total bilateral trade (C) 
Canada  140,870 226,587 367,457 
United States  220,104 163,721 383,825 
  Total Merchandise trade (D) 
Canada  221,346 259,903 481,248 
United States  1,180,154 730,803 1,910,957 
  Share of agricultural trade that is bilateral (A/B) 
Canada  65.0% 64.9% 64.9% 
United States  31.9% 14.4% 23.1% 
  Share of bilateral trade that is agricultural (A/C) 
Canada  7.2% 9.6% 8.7% 
United States  9.9% 6.2% 8.3% 
  Share of total merchandise trade that is bilateral (C/D) 
Canada  63.6% 87.2% 76.4% 
United States  18.7% 22.4% 20.1% 
Source: WTO data from 2001: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm 
Notes:  
1Agricultural products are defined as food: food and live animals; beverages and tobacco; animal and 
vegetable oils, fats and waxes; oilseeds and oleaginous fruit (SITC sections 0, 1, 4 and division 22). Raw 
materials: hides, skins and furskins, raw; crude rubber (including synthetic and reclaimed); cork and wood; 
pulp and waste-paper; textile fibers and their wastes; crude animal and vegetable materials, n.e.s. (SITC 
divisions 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29). 
2The export figures for “Bilateral Agricultural Trade” are deducted from the import figures for the two 
countries. 
 
Cohn (1990) noted that the importance of agriculture in the bilateral relationship stems 
from the central role that the United States and Canada play in the global food system,   7 
their importance as exporters of many temperate-zone products onto world markets and 
the high level of interdependence among the two economies. The extent of the bilateral 
trade flows is likely to underestimate the significance of the total economic and political 
relationship in the area of food and agricultural products in part because agriculture is 
important in the global trade politics of both countries. This argument has been 
strengthened in the years since the Uruguay Round, as the management of agricultural 
and food trade has shifted increasingly to the WTO and as further negotiations on the 
reduction of support and protection levels have progressed. The extent to which the 
United States and Canada share similar objectives in these multilateral arenas is an 
important part of the trade relationship.  
Trade policy in agriculture, as in other areas, reflects two competing pressures: to expand 
trade by reducing costs of movement of goods between nations and to protect domestic 
investment and jobs. The balance between the two forces is influenced by foreign policy 
as well as domestic political considerations. The trade relationship itself reflects 
developments on the international stage, within the region or in the wider global 
economy. In addition, agricultural trade relations reflect the politics of domestic farm 
programs. These influences on the bilateral agricultural relationship are discussed in more 
detail below. 
In spite of sharing an early history and a long commercial border the history and policy 
tradition of trade has differed in certain important respects between Canada and the 
United States. Canada’s relationship with the British Commonwealth, had a profound 
effect on agricultural trade patterns, perhaps even more than in other areas of trade. This 
diverted interest from the development of trade in agricultural goods within North 
America until the 1980s. A major change began with the accession of the UK to the EC 
in 1973. Canada’s traditional market in the UK was drastically reduced as imports of 
wheat, meat, fruit and dairy products from continental Europe began to replace supplies 
from the Commonwealth. Though agricultural products were not high on the agenda in 
the CUSTA discussions, the decision to include them at all signalled a beginning of a 
more integrated North American market for farm and food products.
3 
The inclusion of agriculture in CUSTA, although not extending to the sensitive sectors 
(for Canada) of dairy and poultry products, did signal a new era for bilateral agricultural 
trade. Importantly, it included a trigger for opening up trade in cereals: if one partner’s 
support level were higher than that of the other then import restrictions had to be 
withdrawn. Within a period of three years this condition, essentially precluding the use of 
trade barriers to maintain higher levels of protection, had secured close to free trade in 
cereals across the border.
4 NAFTA in essence grand-fathered the CUSTA agricultural 
                                                 
3 Canadian negotiators at the CUSTA talks told to prevent agriculture from holding up the negotiations. 
The main problems from the Canadian agricultural side were the operations of the Provincially-based 
supply-control agencies which relied on quantitative control of intra-provincial as well as international 
trade (see below). 
4 The trigger was based on the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE), a measure of transfers under farm 
policies developed by Josling and popularized by the OECD. This represented the first time such an 
“objective” trigger had been used in trade negotiations, though its use in the Uruguay Round was under   8 
arrangements into the new trilateral, and therefore had a more direct impact on US-
Mexico trade.
5 Other aspects of the NAFTA chapter on agriculture, on export subsidies 
and domestic support were relatively weak, in effect suggesting common positions to be 
taken in the GATT talks and foreshadowing some of their eventual provisions. 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture provided by far the most comprehensive 
framework for the bilateral agricultural trade relationship. It provided for the conversion 
of quantitative import restrictions into tariffs, thus eliminating the import quotas used by 
Canada’s supply control system for dairy and poultry. The multilateral agreement also 
effectively obliged Canada to remove subsidies on the movement of grain to the eastern 
livestock producers and to the western ports. The United States had to abandon its own 
import quota policies (mandated under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act) 
and curb its export subsidy policies. The adoption of an agreement on health and safety 
standards, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS), improved on 
the rather weaker provisions in NAFTA for preventing border conflicts over such 
measures.
6 Finally, the strengthening of the dispute settlement process in the Uruguay 
Round provided a useful counterpart to the bilateral dispute resolution procedures in 
CUSTA and NAFTA. The discussion in this paper emphasizes the significance of these 
multiple provisions for settling trade disputes in defining the bilateral trade relationship in 
agriculture. 
Trade disputes in agriculture, as in other areas of trade, can reflect either friction due to 
an increase in trade or the existence of impediments to such an increase. Frictional 
disputes, reflecting rapid increases in trade in sensitive products, show up primarily as 
anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases brought by industries in the importing 
country. Impediment cases, reflecting the absence of trade or the additional costs imposed 
on exporters, show up as market access cases and relate to tariffs, quotas and import 
standards such as SPS and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) measures.
7 Trade disputes 
involving market access are brought by the exporter, though these might be in response to 
actions by the importer seeking to slow or impede the growth of trade. Thus a description 
of the trade disputes mirrors both expansion and repression of trade.  
For the purposes of putting agricultural trade relations between the United States and 
Canada in perspective, it is convenient to compare the incidence of bilateral trade 
disputes with the magnitude of bilateral trade flows. Table 1.3 shows the profile of anti-
dumping and countervailing duty complaints heard by the national authorities in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
consideration at about the same time. Obviously, the measure itself came under scrutiny from those who 
opposed market opening, and led to discussion about the way particular programs were counted.  
5 Agricultural trade between Mexico and Canada was not a major issue, though Canada insisted that the 
protection of the “milk and feathers” sectors was included in that bilateral part of the NAFTA. 
6 NAFTA did include some mutual recognition and equivalence provisions for meat inspection, but these 
have not always been implemented in the manner envisaged. 
7 In agricultural trade, the realm of health and safety regulations are referred to as Sanitary or Phytosanitary 
(SPS) Regulations and those not relating to health issues are usually called Technical Barriers to Trade . 
This distinction is now embedded in the WTO Agreements.    9 
United States (by the USITC) and in Canada (by the CITT) since 1988.
8 The incidence of 
bilateral trade remedy cases was equally distributed: of these 104 cases, 51 were 
considered by the CITT and 53 by the USITC. The preponderance of the Canadian cases 
(47) were anti-dumping as were the majority of the US cases (35). Of the Canadian cases, 
fifteen involved agricultural commodities (29 percent), while twelve of the US cases (23 
percent) were agricultural. This compares with agricultural trade shares of bilateral flows 
of 8.3 percent for the United States and 8.7 percent for Canada (Table 1.2). Thus there is 
little doubt that trade conflicts, as measured by complaints to the domestic authorities, are 
disproportionately high in agriculture.
9  
The same imbalance is not evident within the agricultural sector. Fifty percent of the 
Canadian agricultural cases involved the United States and 26 percent of the US cases 
involved trade with Canada. These proportions mirror the significance of bilateral 
agricultural trade flows, with 65 percent of Canadian agricultural trade being bilateral and 
23 percent of US agricultural trade crossing the northern border. So, while agriculture is a 
fertile source of trade disputes, bilateral trade is no more contentious than trade with third 
countries. 
                                                 
8 A brief explanation of the two trade remedy systems is included in Annex B. 
9 There are may ways to consider these proportions and it may be that if a few large and relatively dispute 
free areas (such as automobiles and automobile parts) are removed the agricultural shares differ little from 
other areas of trade. Furthermore, product definitions are relatively fine in agricultural trade creating the 
opportunity for many relatively small scale disputes.    10 
Table 1.3: Relative importance of agricultural border disputes between Canada and 
the U.S. in bilateral and all trade disputes. 
  Antidumping  Countervailing  Total 
1 
   Bilateral agricultural trade(A) 
Canada (CITT)   12 3  15 
United States (USITC)  7 5  12 
   All agricultural cases (B) 
Canada (CITT)   24 6  30 
United States (USITC)  34 13  47 
   All bilateral cases (C) 
Canada (CITT)   47 4  51 
United States (USITC)  35 18  53 
   Proportion of agricultural cases that are bilateral (A/B) 
Canada (CITT)   50% 50%  50% 
United States (USITC)  21% 38%  26% 
  Proportion of bilateral cases that are agricultural (A/C) 
Canada (CITT)   26% 75%  29% 
United States (USITC)  20% 28%  23% 
Source: CITT and USITC websites. 
1 Multi-country cases have been counted as a case for every country involved: the totals shown here 
therefore exceed the number of separate cases. 
Agricultural cases exclude Fish, Seafood and Timber products as well as highly processed or industrial 
products such as Butter cookies, Baby Food and Saccharin.  
All cases after 1988 are included. Cases prior to 1988 are only included if the ruling was affirmative and 
orders were in place after the beginning of 1988. 
 
One aspect of the improved global framework for agricultural trade has been the 
strengthened dispute settlement process, as a result of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) of the WTO. Canada and the United States have each made full 
use of the DSU, and have been involved in seventeen cases in the WTO on agricultural 
issues. Of these seventeen, the United States has been the requesting (complaining) 
country in eight cases and Canada in four. Canada has been the respondent in two such 
cases and the United States in six of them. In a number of other cases, the United States 
or Canada have joined the requests for consultation and the setting up of a panel: Canada 
has joined in eleven requests and the United States in four. On nine of the seventeen 
cases, the United States and Canada have found themselves to be on the “same side.” 
Canada has been the respondent to only one case where the United States has been the 
requesting country, and one case where the United States joined the request, whereas the 
United States has had to respond to three requests from Canada and another three where 
Canada joined the request.   11 
 
  
2. Comparison of Agricultural and Trade Policies 
Trade relations in agriculture are inevitably linked with domestic farm policies. Without 
these policies it would be much easier to manage the trade relationship. This section 
discusses the similarities and differences between Canada and the United States in the 
types of agricultural policies employed and in the political and administrative 
environment. 
US Policy Developments 
Since the 1930s, the United States has periodically renewed and adapted its domestic 
farm subsidy programs. For example, Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, 
which is schedules to last until 2007, replaced the Food and Agriculture Improvement 
and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996, which covered years 1996 to 2002.
10 The FAIR Act was 
supplemented by ad hoc legislation providing additional subsidies starting in 1998, when 
farm prices fell. Earlier the Farm, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade (FACT) Act of 
1990 (together with the farm spending portions of the Omnibus Budget Reauthorization 
Act of 1990) replaced the Food Security Act of 1985. Each of these laws took the legal 
form of temporary amendments of the so-called “permanent” authorizing legislation of 
1949. The 1949 Act itself was just one of the periodic laws that have governed the 
production and marketing of selected farm commodities in the United States since the 
mid 1930s (HSUS, forthcoming). In addition to these laws, specialized legislation, 
dealing with specific commodities or specific issues, has become more important. For 
example, subsidized crop insurance programs have expanded over the past decade as a 
result to special “reform” legislation. Although U.S. agriculture is large and diverse, 
about 80 percent of all farm program payments, which are the traditional focus of farm 
bill debates, are provided to a small range of crops—grains, oilseeds (now including 
peanuts) and cotton that produce about 40 percent of farm cash receipts. Several minor or 
specialty commodities such as honey and wool also receive substantial payments relative 
to the size of the industries. Dairy is supported by a complex set of marketing regulations 
that allows price discrimination within the United States, by trade barriers, by a small 
export subsidy program, and more recently by direct payments accounting for about 10 
percent of the total payments to US agriculture. A few other commodities, notably beef, 
sugar, peanuts and frozen concentrated orange juice have significant trade barriers. But, 
despite crop insurance subsidies, disaster aids, marketing regulations and occasional ad 
hoc programs, government subsidy or protection for most of the rest of U.S. agriculture is 
quite low. In particular, the meats, fruits and tree nuts, vegetables and melons, ornamental 
crops and hay crops receive almost no program payments and, even including import 
barriers (with a few exceptions, such as frozen concentrated orange juice), have little 
                                                 
10 The USDA Economic Research Service describes US farm programs in summary and in detail. The farm 
policy “Briefing Room” is an excellent source of description and analysis. See 
www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FarmPolicy/.   12 
support compared to the program crops and sugar. The average producer support 
equivalent for these commodities, which comprise more than half of U.S. agriculture, is 
less than 10 percent of total revenue, and this figure includes broad support such as 
research and extension (Sumner and Brunke, 2004). In discussing U.S. commodity 
programs we should not loose sight of which commodities are left out. 
OECD Producer Support Estimates (PSEs) for US agriculture provide calculations for the 
main subsidized crops and the main livestock industries. However, these estimates are not 
provided for the horticultural industry, which is largely unsubsidized and so the sector-
wide averages are misleading. These estimates also vary from year to year inversely with 
farm prices. Furthermore, PSEs are not designed to reflect production or trade distortion 
elements of policies. Therefore, they must be interpreted with care as a summary of 
policy impacts or even policy changes. With those caveats, we note that the overall PSE 
for US agriculture report was 25 percent for the 1986 through 88 period and 23 percent 
for the 1999 through 2001 period. 
The main subsidy programs for grains, cotton and oilseeds provide three forms of 
payments and each subsidizes production and thereby distorts trade flows to some degree. 
“Direct payments” have the least impact on production because they are tied to historical 
production bases, allow alternative land uses without affecting payments and do not vary 
with current market prices. However, the 2002 Act allowed updating of “historical” bases 
and the some crops and all non-farm land uses are prohibited on land receiving payments. 
The “counter-cyclical” payments are similar to direct payments except that they vary 
inversely with the US average market price of each supported crop and thus provide an 
additional element of risk protection. Finally, the marketing loan program provides 
payments on current production whenever the market price falls below a “loan rate”. This 
program encourages production by promising additional revenue to offset low prices 
directly. 
The United States has eliminated annual land set aside programs that used to be tied to 
price supports. However, a major long-term land retirement scheme, the Conservation 
Reserve Program, pays cropland owners to idle approximately 37 million acres of land, 
much of which would otherwise be used for grains, oilseeds, cotton or hay. 
 Dairy policy in the United States long had three major components: (i) border measures 
that create import barriers for most dairy products and export subsidies for a few 
manufactured dairy products; (ii) federal and state marketing orders that regulate raw 
milk prices; and (iii) government purchases of manufactured dairy products to support the 
farm price of milk. Periodically there have been ad hoc supply control measures and 
starting in 2002 a major new direct payment program was created that has distributed 
funds equivalent to between 5 percent and 10 percent of milk revenue each year because 
prices fell below trigger levels for at least part of the year. 
The most important feature of US dairy policy is the tariff rate quota policy which limits 
imports to only a few percentage of domestic consumption and allows dairy product 
prices in the United States to exceed prices trade in world markets by about 30 percent on 
average. This still leaves US dairy prices well below those in Canada however. The direct 
production and export subsidy elements of US dairy policy are small compared to the 
trade barriers and the marketing order system mainly limits trade within the United States   13 
and reduces consumption of fluid milk while slightly subsidizing the price of cheese, 
butter and dry milk powder. The final element of the policy, the price support, also has a 
relatively small impact but has kept the price of no-fat dry milk above a minimum during 
periods of extremely low prices. 
The meat industry in the United States is relatively unsubsidized. The TRQ for beef 
specifies a tariff of about 25 percent for beef entering above the quota quantities, but the 
quota has not been filled in recent years and the US is a major unsubsidized beef 
exporter. The pork and poultry industries are minimally protected or subsidized. The 
most important and controversial programs for the meat industries in recent years have 
been SPS regulations. The US has dealt with a series of outbreaks of poultry diseases that 
have been eradicated or controlled with government aid. In December 2003, a finding of 
one cow with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) (after a similar event in Canada 
in May 2003) caused major disruption and a series government measures to reassure 
consumers and attempt to reopen international markets. The similar positions of the 
United States and Canada in attempting to deal with the BSE findings may allow some 
common responses and perhaps even additional cooperation. 
Crop insurance programs comprise the most important subsidy for the rest of US 
agriculture and is also important for grains cotton and oilseeds. The subsidy element in 
crop insurance policies often exceeds 50 percent and the budget costs of premium 
subsidy plus additional losses has been about $2 billion per year in rencet years. Most of 
this goes to the major program crops but the subsidy to fruits and vegetables in 
significant in some cases. Nonetheless, the overall subsidy rates for horticultural crops in 
the United States averages about 5 percent.  
Evolution of U.S. Commodity Policy towards Compatibility with an Open 
Border with Canada 
The evolution of US farm programs has been uneven, but over the past 20 years has 
moved to become more compatible with open international trade. High internal price 
supports have been replaced with payments and most payments have less production 
subsidy elements than they had in the past. In addition, the United States no longer idles 
productive land to attempt to prop up domestic prices and no longer stores large 
quantities of grains and cotton. 
The explicit export subsidies that the United States had used periodically are most 
eliminated or reduced to insignificance. Remaining export programs for promotion and 
food aid have some subsidy element, but much less than the direct payments to exporters. 
The United States government does provide export credit guarantees for less credit-worth 
buyers and the subsidy element in that program has been an element of contention, 
especially as the United States has called for elimination of direct export subsidies and 
additional disciplines on state trading enterprises such as the Canadian Wheat Board. 
Despite gradual reforms, US farm programs are by no means free of trade distortion. 
Perhaps surprisingly, however, the subsidy elements of the main US subsidies have not 
been the main source of agricultural trade contretemps between the United States and 
Canada.    14 
 
Canada’s Agricultural Policies 
The decade of the 1990s marked a significant shift in agricultural policies in Canada. 
Specifically, the sector moved to a substantially less subsidized position and a somewhat 
more open trade environment. The OECD monitors government support to farmers with a 
measure termed the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) that is an estimate of the value of 
all financial support and border protection from policies that support agriculture, or the 
transfers farmers receive from taxpayers and consumers due to those policies.  
By this measure, most countries have reduced their support to agriculture from a 
benchmark period, 1986-88, to 1999-2001. However, few countries have reduced their 
support as significantly as has Canada. As a percentage of total farm receipts, the PSE for 
Canada has fallen from about 34 percent to 18 percent over this thirteen-year period, a 
decline in support of almost one-half (Dewbre and Short). Most of this decline was due to 
cuts in government subsidy support. The major component of border protection, the 
higher domestic prices due to quota and tariff protection in the dairy and poultry sectors, 
has not been changed significantly. Other elements of border protection, outside supply 
management, have declined and in most cases have been removed altogether. 
What has come about from this policy change since the mid-late 1980s is a dichotomous 
policy framework. Eighty percent of agriculture by sales receives modest government 
budget support and little or no border protection. The result is that the bulk of the sector 
faces world prices for their products, with a moderately low slung safety net to protect 
farmers when world prices fall or vary. The remaining part of the sector, dairy and 
poultry production, has remained heavily protected through commodity marketing boards 
with the power to control aggregate supply through domestic and import quotas. The 
actual level of protection in this sector has hardly diminished even since the Uruguay 
Round Agreement, mostly due to the prohibitively high over-Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) 
tariffs and small TRQ levels. 
Canadian agricultural policy has also moved away from traditional support prices and 
from commodity-specific policy in general. This shift was only strengthened by the very 
substantial mid-1990s reduction in budgetary support of the sector noted above. I Canada 
has no general commodity subsidy, no direct payments, and no government commodity 
purchases. To illustrate the importance of these program cuts, the federal government in 
1995/96 removed the grain freight rate subsidy on grain exports from the Prairies region 
to grain terminals such as Vancouver, a cut of about $800 million (Canadian) per year. It 
is now the case there are no significant export subsidies in Canada, aside from loan 
guarantees on export credit. In addition, a direct subsidy on milk production was removed 
over the period from 1995 to 2002 that reduced budgetary support by $300 million.  
In the place of a commodity focus, federal government expenditure policy has moved 
clearly to the goal of stabilization. This has taken the form of a pattern of cross-
commodity, insurance-style schemes that focus on aggregate net farm income and crop 
yield stability with a moderate degree of subsidy. These programs are still evolving as a 
response to a late-1990s combination of low world prices and domestic production 
shortfalls, introducing a greater capacity to cover such farm income “disasters.” As the   15 
program scope has widened (and renamed as the Canadian Agricultural Income 
Stabilization (CAIS) program) to cover “disaster” situations, so has the potential 
expenditure. The federal government cost of this “risk management” support has risen to 
an expected $1 billion for 2004, about double the nominal level in the early 1990s. 
This modified stabilization policy is one element of a new policy framework that has 
recently been adopted, the Agricultural Policy Framework or APF, which is based on five 
main pillars: (a) food safety and quality, (b) the environment, (c) science and innovation, 
(d) sectoral renewal, and (e) business risk management (AAFC 2002). Only in the latter 
category do you have some continuity with earlier emphases on commodity markets. This 
framework is rather different from the previous strategy, entitled Growing Together 
(1989) as is described in Rude and Meilke (2003, p.417): “Trade, regulatory barriers and 
cost structures are seldom mentioned in the APF. The focus is more on niche markets, 
branding a unique Canadian product and controlling attributes throughout the food chain, 
rather than on commodity markets… Only in the area of business risk management is 
there some overlap with … commodity markets.” Under that category this strategy 
emphasizes “adaptation and innovation, encouraging producers to proactively manage the 
risks facing their farms, whole farm programs, national, stable, predictable, 
comprehensive government programs, and financial sustainability” (p. 416). 
This does not cover the budget situation for all government programs. There is still 
research funding where expenditures have been maintained in real terms, largely through 
federal government programs. There are also a wide variety of environmental programs 
with components such as protecting water supplies, providing environmental amenities 
like wetlands and areas of biodiversity, and programs to reduce waste water run-off, but 
total budget support is modest. There are no conservation reserves as still practiced in the 
United States or land set-aside policies tied in with price supports as was found in the 
United States. Against this, extension support under provincial government support has 
fallen substantially. Input subsidies and programs to invest in rural infrastructure have 
also become rare and modest in funding level. 
So agricultural policy in terms of budgetary support has changed quite considerably over 
the last 15 years since CUSTA was adopted. What remains is much less distortionary in 
terms of effects on agricultural input and output markets, and remaining funding is much 
more decoupled. 
However, not all Canadian agricultural policy has been reformed. There remains the 
supply management policy that covers the dairy and poultry sectors (20 percent of total 
revenue for the agricultural sector). This policy regime relies upon high levels of border 
protection and farm-level marketing quotas to generate farm-level prices that are well 
above border levels. The border protection involves a series of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) 
usually at levels of 5-10 percent of domestic consumption, coupled with very high over-
quota tariffs. These tariffs are in the range of 100-250 percent, but there is much “water” 
in these tariffs. The result is that these industries are heavily insulated from the operation 
of world markets. The marketing quotas restrict farm production to a level that roughly 
equals domestic consumption. This regime now involves little budget support. But it does 
rely on an extensive network of regulations and controls to enforce the operation of the 
system in addition to the marketing quotas. These apply mostly at the farm level but   16 
include restrictions on the inter-provincial movement of many raw and processed dairy 
and poultry products. In terms of its fundamentals, this system has not changed since the 
mid-1970s. 
The supply management system generates very high economic rents. The value of farm 
level quotas for the dairy industry alone is in the range of $16-22 billion (Canadian), 
which works out to about $1 million per farm, or $20,000 per cow. Although the poultry 
sector is smaller in aggregate, the per farm quota values are as high as in the dairy sector, 
or higher. With these values at stake, or in view of the annual income flows that must 
exist to generate these quota values, there are very strong and effective lobbies within this 
sector, defending it against trade policy changes or any changes in its operation. To say 
this sector is resistant to policy reform is to understate the case. In terms of its 
fundamentals, this sector has not changed since its inception in the early to mid 1970s. It 
has weathered all three trade agreements noted, many changes of government, 
widespread public debate, and numerous legal challenges by farmers and others inside 
and outside the system.  
The other element of Canadian agricultural policy that is a significant part of agricultural 
policy and has not changed fundamentally for some years is another marketing board, the 
Canadian Wheat Board. There is no supply control involved here and no significant 
ongoing government subsidy, but the marketing system involves the operation of the 
Board as a state trading enterprise. This does not directly generate the kind of rents seen 
in the supply management sector, and the wheat industry is competitive on world 
markets, but there is little transparency in the Wheat Board’s operations. This fuels 
domestic and international debate about its practices and their effects. It has both an 
export monopoly as well as a monopsony over purchase of wheat and most types of 
barley. These powers have increasingly come under domestic debate and controversy, 
particularly from certain groups of farmers affected by the regime. But like the supply 
management sector, this institution is also quite resistant to reform, whether from 
domestic or international pressure. 
These policy changes have resulted in a divergence in agricultural policy between Canada 
and the U.S. The U.S. policy framework remains substantially affected by government 
support programs of various types that provide U.S. farmers with some insulation from 
world price variability. On the other hand, there is no large scale counterpart in the U.S. 
to Canada’s supply management system. 
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Table 2.1: Milestones in Recent Canadian and US Agricultural Domestic and Trade Policies 
Year  Canadian Policy  US Policy 
1983  Western Grain Transportation Act (WGTA) passed   
1985   Enactment of Food Security Act  
Beginning of the Export enhancement 
program 
1986  Creation of the National Tripartite Stabilization 
Program (NTSP) 
Implementation of the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP) and other provisions of the 
FSA of 1985 
1990   Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade 
Act (US Farm Bill) 
1991  Establishment of Gross Revenue Insurance 
Program (GRIP)  
 
  Initiation of the Net Income Stabilization Account 
(NISA)  
 
1993  Termination of the National Tripartite 
Stabilization Program (NTSP) for red meats  
 
1994   Crop Insurance Reform Act  
1995  Replacement of quantitative import restrictions 
with tariff rate quotas as border protection 
 
  Elimination of the Western Grain Transportation 
Act (WGTA 
 
  Cancellation of the Feed Freight Assistance 
program 
 
  Initiation of the Canadian Adaptation and Rural 
Development (CARD) Fund  
 
  Introduction of the Matching Investment Initiative 
Program (MII)  
 
1996  Termination of the Gross Revenue Insurance 
Program (GRIP) 
US Federal Agricultural Improvement and 
Reform Act (US Farm Bill) 
   Introduction of the Environmental Quality 
Incentives Program (EQIP) 
1997  Termination of the entire National Tripartite 
Stabilization Program (NTSP) 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997  
  Establishment of the Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency 
 
1998   Tax and Trade Relief Extension Act 
Ad hoc Market Loss Assistance Program  
1999  Canadian Agricultural Income Disaster Assistance 
(AIDA) program implemented  
Ad hoc Market Loss Assistance Program 
Implementation of milk marketing order 
reforms 
  Canadian Adaptation and Rural Development 
(CARD) Fund became a continuous program 
2000 crop insurance reform act  
Ad hoc Market Loss Assistance Program 
2001    Ad hoc Market Loss Assistance Program 
2002  Canadian Federal Dairy Subsidy to be phased out 
by January 31; Supply management remains in 
place 
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (US 
Farm Bill) 
Sources: Gellner and Rattray, in Loyns et.al. (2001); Young, Nelson, Dixit, and Conklin, in Loyns et.al. 
(2001); Hart, (2000); USDA farm policy website at http://www.usda.gov/farmbill/   18 
3. Bilateral Agricultural Trade Flows 
This section gives a brief view of bilateral agricultural trade flows, as a prelude to the 
discussion of the specific disputes that have occurred in recent years. Disputes often 
reflect changes in trade flows, both when trade increases rapidly and when markets are 
lost. Commodity trade developments therefore give a reasonable view of the likely locus 
of the most significant trade disputes. Before turning to individual commodity trade flows 
we examine the aggregate trade flows, both for their patterns over time and the 
composition of trade. 
The real (net of inflation) aggregate agricultural trade flows are significant in terms of 
their increase, shown in Figure 3.1. Over the twenty-eight year period from 1975 to 2003, 
total trade, measured as the sum of each country’s exports, grew at a compound rate of 
4.5 percent per year or increased by 3.4 times. But as is clear in Figure 3.1 below, 
Canadian exports grew much more quickly. While U.S. exports grew at a rate of 2.8 
percent annually, Canada’s exports grew at 7.3 percent. By itself, this might be taken as 
an indicator that Canada would experience a larger number of disputes on those export 
commodities, at least of the trade remedy variety. 
A question of some interest is, has there been an impact on these aggregate trade flows, 
and then possibly on disputes, from the opening up of the border with the Canada-U.S. 
Free Trade Agreement. The CUSTA was implemented in 1989, so we can divide the 
period into a pre-CUSTA period from 1975 to 1988, and the post-CUSTA period from 
1988 to 2003 and compare trade growth rates. The post-CUSTA period will also reveal 
the influence of further border opening due to the Uruguay Round Agreement. Although 
this is a casual test of the influence of these trade agreements, the results are still worth 
noting.  In the first period, total real agricultural trade was growing at 2.8 percent per 
year.  Following 1988, trade grew much more rapidly, at 6.0 percent annually.
11  
Decomposing trade by country, we find that although exports from Canada were growing 
more quickly than exports from the U.S., most of the post-1988 increase in trade growth 
rates occurred from U.S. exports.  Real Canadian agricultural exports grew at 7.0 percent 
per year up to 1988, and then grew at 8.0 percent in the latter period. U.S. exports grew at 
0.7 percent annually up to 1988 and at 4.7 percent since 1988.  These results would 
appear to suggest that the opening up of the Canadian border post-CUSTA was more 
significant to agricultural trade in that it was followed by a much larger increase in U.S. 
exports moving north than occurred with Canadian exports flowing south. Although 
Canadian exports were growing at a faster rate than U.S. exports after 1988, they were 
also growing much more rapidly prior to 1988. These results may appear to conflict with 
news reports of dramatic increases in Canadian agricultural exports in the 1990s. 
However, it should be remembered that these data are in U.S., not Canadian, dollars. So 
they do not reflect that part of the increased exports measured in Canadian dollars that is 
due to the depreciation of the Canadian dollar that occurred since 1990. 
                                                 
11 A strong case can be made that this result is substantially due to the opening up of the border through 
these trade agreements.  Any exchange rate effects will tend to cancel each other out because the gain in 
exports from one country’s currency depreciation will be offset by the loss in exports from the other 
currency’s appreciation.   19 
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Source: ERS historical trade data, USDA Fatus database, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(GDP deflator), figures given are in real 2000 U.S. dollar terms. 
 
 
The composition of Canadian agricultural exports to the United States is shown in Figure 
3.2. The rapid expansion of agricultural trade in bulk commodities and animal products is 
striking. Exports of animal products from Canada to the United States reached nearly $4 
billion in 2002 (before falling to just over $3.1 billion in 2003 as a consequence of the 
occurrence of the first case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in Canada), up 
from $1.5 billion in 1990. Canadian shipments of bulk commodities to the United States 
increased from nearly $800 million in 1990 to over $2.8 billion in 2003. Canada has also 
increasingly become an exporter of horticultural goods. Canadian exports of such goods 
increased from around $500 million in 1990 to nearly $2 billion in 2003 while processed 
intermediate goods peaked at about $2.5 billion in 1996. The rise in exports seems to 
have corresponded to the freer trade with the United States following the introduction of 
CUSTA and NAFTA, though obviously there could have been many other causes.    20 
Figure 3.2: Composition of Canadian Agricultural Exports to the United States by 

















*Other includes sugar, beverages (w/o fruit juice and wine), and nearly $900 million of noncompetitive 
imports, such as cocoa, coffee and tea
 









The pattern of U.S. exports to Canada shows some strong similarities (see Figure 3.3). 
Especially bulk commodities and high-value horticultural products have accounted for 
the major part of the expansion of agricultural products exported by the United States, 
with horticultural products reaching nearly $3.6 billion by 2003, up from $2 billion in 
1990, and bulk commodities increasing from $930 million in 1990 to $2.8 billion in 
2003. However, exports of animal products have also been growing and rose from $800 
million in 1990 to $1.4 billion in 2003.    21 

















*Other includes sugar, essential oils, beverages (w/o fruit juice and wine)
 
Source: USDA, Fatus Database 
 
Figure 3.4 presents the changes in the shares over time of these four categories of 
agricultural goods. Both Canada and the United States shipped bulk commodities worth 
about 30 percent of their total agricultural exports, up slightly from the early 1990s. 
Canada’s share of animal products in total agricultural trade has decreased from 47 
percent in 1990 to 38 percent in 2002 and then to 30 percent after BSE in 2003. The U.S. 
share of animal products in total agricultural exports has decreased slightly from 19 
percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 2003. Horticultural products made up 14 percent of all 
agricultural exports from Canada to the United States, but by 2003 that share had 
increased to 24 percent. Horticultural products made up nearly half of all agricultural 
exports in the early 1990s, but by 2003 that share had fallen to around 40 percent. The 
share of other agricultural commodities was relatively unchanged in both Canada and the 
United States over the last 14 years. The U.S. share increased slightly from 11 percent in 
1990 to 14 percent in 2003 and Canada’s share increased from 15 percent to 18 percent.   22 
 
Figure 3.4: Composition of Canadian and United States Bilateral Agricultural 
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Note: With regard to U.S. imports, Other contains sugar, beverages (w/o fruit juice and 
wine), and nearly $900 million of noncompetitive imports, such as cocoa, coffee and tea. 
On the U.S. exports side, other includes sugar, essential oils, beverages (w/o fruit juice 
and wine) 
Source: based on tables 3.2 and 3.3 
 
Commodity trade patterns are a function both of policy differences and natural cost 
advantages. They also give rise to trade tensions in a much more direct and recognizable 
way than the more aggregated figures discussed above. Figure 3.5 shows the recent 
development in the bilateral trade in grains and oilseeds.12 Among the most dramatic 
increases in trade patterns among the unprocessed goods has been the rise in Canadian 
exports to the United States in grains and oilseeds, much of it in cereals. Over the 
fourteen years period 1990-2003 the value of such trade increased from $782 million to 
                                                 
12 Discussion of the commodity trade flows focuses on the last decade, to correspond to the period of trade 
relations discussed in the next section. Data is from the USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United 
States Database   23 
over $2.8 billion. Canadian shipments to the United States had already reached nearly 
$2.5 billion in 1997, but slowed down a little in the late 1990s, just to increase to the 
2003 level in recent years. Grains and oilseeds have also moved north, and the increase in 
value of U.S. exports to Canada is similar to the trade in the other direction. U.S. grain 
and oilseed exports to Canada increased from $866 million in 1990 to $2.7 billion in 
2003. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that grain and oilseed trade within North 
America has responded significantly to the opening up of trade stemming from CUSTA, 
when the support-level trigger brought down trade barriers on bilateral grain sales. 
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Trade in live cattle show some interesting trends over the past decade (Figures 3.6). 
Canada has been the beneficiary of easier entry into the U.S. market in addition to being 
aided by a cheaper Canadian dollar. Sales of live cattle coming south doubled from 1990 
to 2002, when the value of Canadian exports totaled over $1.1 billion. Canadian beef 
exports to the United States grew rapidly after 1991 and increased again from 1999 to 
2002. However, the value of live cattle exports from Canada to the United States 
decreased dramatically in 2003 as a response to the discovery of BSE in Canada. Exports 
fell from the high in 2002 to just under $400 million in 2003. Exports of live cattle from 
the United States have been negligible, relative to the trade in the other direction.  
The bilateral beef trade between the two countries (Figure 3.7) was very similar in the 
1993-1995 period when both countries’ exports were valued at about $360 million.  
However, since then, U.S. exports have changed little in value but Canadian exports to   24 
the U.S. have tripled to over $1.1 billion in 2002.  They fell back in 2003 to less than 
$900 million following the BSE discovery in Canada.   
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Source: USDA, Fatus Database   25 
 
The trend in bilateral trade has been somewhat similar in the case of live hogs (swine) 
and pork (see Figures 3.8 and 3.9). Canada increased its sales of hogs to the United States 
rapidly in the period after 1994, with the value of that trade reaching US$400 million by 
2003. US sales to Canada have been less than $1.5 million over the period. Pork trade has 
shown rapid growth growth as well, with Canada’s exports more than doubling from 
$430 million in 1990 to $882 million in 2003. US exports to Canada have shown some 
growth since the mid-1990s and reached almost $190 million in 2003, up from $47 
million in 1995.  The balance of pork trade remains heavily in favor of Canada. Trade 
tensions surfaced in the 1980s, continued into the 1990s, and recurred in early 2004, but 
the reality is of increasing integration and cross-border trade both in the animals and the 
products from the pig sector. 
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In marked contrast to the situation in beef and pork, poultry trade is heavily from south to 
north, in spite of (or perhaps because of) the strict market controls of the Provincial 
poultry marketing boards. Since 1990, the value of poultry and eggs exported from the 
United States to Canada has  nearly doubled to $350 million in 2003. Small volumes of 
trade flow the other way, but they have increased noticeably in recent years. Exports from 
Canadian poultry producers to the United States totaled $140 million in 2003, up from 
$40 million in 1990 and $52 million in 1998. 
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The value of the bilateral vegetable trade between the United States and Canada has 
increased substantially during the period from 1990 to 2003. U.S. exports rose steadily 
from around $800 million in 1990 to over $1.8 billion in 2003 (Figure 3.11). Canadian 
sales of vegetables into the United States increased even more sharply, from $225 million 
in 1990 to nearly $1.7 billion in 2003.  
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Along with the increase in vegetable trade between Canada and the United States, 
bilateral fruit and tree nut trade has also increased during the period from 1990 to 2003 
(Figure 3.12). The value of 2003 U.S. shipments to Canada was at nearly $1.2 billion 
more than four times higher than shipment in the opposite direction and up 50 percent 
from $800 million in 1990. Canadian fruit and tree nut shipments to its southern neighbor 
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4. Bilateral Disputes in Agricultural Trade 
A listing of the trade disputes from the period 1986 to date (i.e. the period of application 
of the CUSTA/NAFTA as well as the period from the start of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations) revels 30 separable cases (see Table 4.1).
13 The most significant individual 
disputes are discussed below, following an overview of their nature.  
We suggested above that agricultural trade disputes arise from both “normal” commercial 
frictions stemming from the rapid increase in trade in a particular commodity, and from 
complaints about market access impediments that reflect slower trade growth than would 
otherwise be the case. The former are brought by the importing country on behalf of 
domestic firms that feel threatened; the latter by the exporting country, usually on behalf 
of firms that would like to expand trade.
14  
In addition, trade disputes can result from a transition period as regulations and trade 
policies adjust to a new trade agreement – even in the absence of any change in trade 
flows. Certainly this has been a feature of US-Canada disputes, as producers in both 
countries have had to come to terms with the implications of new trade policy 
arrangements, both bilateral and multilateral. These can either come from the suspicion of 
a trading partner (or firms within that country) that the terms have been breached or with 
the normal problems of adjusting to changes in the policy environment. These trade 
disputes are distinguished from those relating to normal trade changes by the fact that 
they are essentially government-to-government disputes initiated by trade policy 
administrations with incidental participation by firms and sector representatives. Several 
such issues have arisen in the context of the implementation of CUSTA, NAFTA and the 
URAA. 
Another type of trade conflict is less easy to categorize and resolve. These “systemic” 
problems arise from concerns about policies for regulating and marketing farm products. 
In this category falls those disputes that have centred on the role of the Canadian Wheat 
Board in the grains market and to a lesser the Provincial boards that control supply in 
milk and feather industries. These basic policy conflicts seem less tractable, but progress 
in improving trade relations at the least requires mechanisms for greater transparency and 
mutual understanding, and a gradual increase in the compatibility over time.
15 
                                                 
13 Full details are to be found in the Annex. Each case can be manifest in separate stages, from the initial 
complaint through the review and appeal to bi-national, tri-national or multinational panels. For 
convenience, the numbers in the table (e.g. case 11) refer to the separable cases and the individual stages 
are given decimal notation (e.g. 11.1, 11.2, etc.) 
14 For convenience, we classify conflicts where both countries are exporters of a particular product as being 
similar to those where one exporter complains that market access is denied in the other’s market. 
15 It is at times unclear whether the conflicts are really over the core policy differences or if these mask 
more basic interests in simply protecting domestic markets from imports. We explore this more fully below 
in the context of the wheat disputes.   30 
Table 4.1: Timeline of Canadian/US Trade Disputes  
# Year 
initiated
Commodity Type of Case Original Complainant Insitution Outcome/Ruling Status
1 1979 Sugar and 
Syrups
Antidumping US producers USITC Violation found Closed
2.1 1984 Red Raspberries Antidumping & 
Countervailing
US producers USITC No Violation Closed
2.2 1989 Red Raspberries Dumping Review Canadian exporters CUSTA Inconclusive Closed
3.1 1984 Swine (live) Countervailing US producers USITC Violation found Closed
3.2 1991 Swine (live) Countervailing 
Review





3.3 1991 Swine (live) Countervailing 
Review





3.4 1993 Swine (live)  Extraordinary 
challenge
United States/USTR CUSTA Violation found Closed
3.5 1994 Swine (live)  Countervailing 
dutry review
Canadian producers NAFTA Violation found Closed
4 1985 Whole Potatoes Antidumping Canadian producers CITT Violation found Closed
5 1986 Grain Corn Antidumping Canadian producers CITT Violation found Closed
6 1986 Yellow Onions Antidumping Canadian producers CITT Violation found Closed




United States GATT Violation found Closed
8 1988 Sour Cherries Antidumping Canadian producers CITT Violation found Closed
9.1 1988 Apples Antidumping Canadian producers CITT Violation found Closed
9.2 1994 Apples Antidumping, 
Injury review
Canadian producers NAFTA Terminated Closed
10 1989 Pork Countervailing US producers USITC Violation found Closed
10 1989 Pork Countervailing 
review
Canadian producers, 
Canadian federal and 
provincial 
governments
CUSTA No Violation Closed
10 1989 Pork Countervailing, 
injury review
Canadian producers CUSTA No Violation Closed
10 1991 Pork Extraordinary 
challenge 
United States/USTR CUSTA Inconclusive Closed
11 1991 Beer Antidumping Canadian producers CITT Violation found Closed
11 1991 Beer Dumping, Like 
goods, normal 
value
US producers CUSTA Violation found Closed
11 1991 Beer Dumping, 
Material Injury 
US producers CUSTA Violation found Closed
12 1992 Wheat Export subsidies United States CUSTA No Violation Closed
13 1992 Iceberg Lettuce Antidumping Canadian producers CITT Violation found Closed
14 1992 Cauliflower Antidumping Canadian producers CITT No Violation Closed
15 1992 Tomato Paste  Antidumping Canadian producers CITT No Violation Closed
15 1993 Tomato Paste  Dumping Review US producers CUSTA Terminated Closed
16 1994 Wheat Market  Access United States USITC Violation found Closed  31 
Table 4.1: Timeline of Canadian/US Trade Disputes (contd.) 
# Year 
initiated
Commodity Type of Case Original Complainant Insitution Outcome/Ruling Status
17 1994 Apples Antidumping Canadian producers CITT Violation  found Closed
17 1995 Apples Dumping US exporters NAFTA Terminated Closed
18 1995 Malt beverages Regional 
industry, Injury 
finding
Canadian producers NAFTA Violation found Closed






United States NAFTA No Violation Closed
20 1995 Sugar Antidumping Canadian producers CITT Violation found Closed
1995 Sugar Dumping US exporters NAFTA Violation found Closed
21 1997 Milk Export subsidies United States (and 
New Zealand)
WTO Violation found ongoing
22 1997 Prepared Baby 
Foods
Antidumping United States (Deputy 
Minister of National 
Revenue)
CITT Violation found Closed
22 1998 Prepared Baby 
Foods
Antidumping Canadian producers NAFTA Violation found Closed
23 1998 Cattle, Grain, 
Swine
Import measures Canada WTO Pending ongoing
24 1998 Cattle (R-CALF) Antidumping United States USITC No Violation Closed
24 1998 Cattle (R-CALF) Countervailing United States USITC No Violation Closed
24 1999 Live cattle Injury finding Canadian producers NAFTA Terminated Closed
24 1999 Live cattle Countervailing Canadda NAFTA Terminated Closed
25 1999 Cattle Countervailing 
duty investigation
Canadda WTO Pending ongoing
25 1999 Sugar syrups Reclassification Canada WTO Pending ongoing
26 2000 Corn Antidumping Canadian producers CITT No Violation Closed
26 2000 Corn Countervailing Canadian producers CITT No Violation Closed
27 2001 Tomatoes 
(greenhouse) 
Antidumping US producers USITC No Violation Closed
27 2002 Tomatoes 
(greenhouse) 
Sales at less than 
fair value
Canadian producers NAFTA Terminated Closed
27 2002 Tomatoes 
(greenhouse) 
Sales at less than 
fair value
Canadian producers NAFTA Terminated Closed
28 2001 Tomatoes       
(Fresh)
Antidumping Canadian producers CITT No Violation Closed
29 2002 Wheat Non-
discrimination
United States WTO Pending ongoing
30 2002 Wheat Countervailing US producers USITC Pending ongoing
30 2002 Wheat Antidumping US producers USITC Pending ongoing  32 
The climate for trade relations can also influence the severity of conflicts. If the market is 
expanding, these frictions can by small: competition for a growing market may 
sometimes lead to complaints, but trade remedies are usually not available in such cases 
and subsidies are less likely to be the reason for trade shifts. Much of the growth in 
bilateral trade mentioned above in high-value goods has taken place with little conflict at 
the government level. If the market is not growing, problems become more difficult to 
handle, as market shares can change rapidly. In these cases, although these changes in 
shares may represent the “normal” workings of the market, firms and industry groups will 
tend to look to trade remedies for relief.  
The impact of the state of the commodity market suggests that one would expect to find 
trade disputes clustered in those sectors with rapid changes in trade patterns. Table 4.2 
shows the commodity classification of 53 bilateral actions (corresponding to the 30 
separate cases in Figure 4.1) by commodity involved. Twenty-eight percent of the cases 
involved fruits and vegetables, the great majority of these being brought by Canada, as 
US exports increased and threatened firms, particularly in British Columbia. Forty 
percent of all cases brought by Canada concerned trade in this sector. The pigs and 
poultry sector accounted for seventeen percent of all actions (and the same percentage of 
both Canadian and US cases) indicating the concerns on both sides of the border over 
changes in trade pattern in this area. Trade in grains has also been contentious, and this 
sector accounts for fifteen percent of all actions (ten percent of Canadian and 22 percent 
of US initiated actions). Importantly, three of the eight “unresolved” issues affect grain. 
Cattle and dairy disputes are numerically less significant, with cattle accounting for ten 
percent of Canadian disputes and dairy nine percent of those started by the United States.  
Table 4.2. Classification of US-Canada bilateral trade disputes by commodities 
Brought by  Resolution (check these now!)  Cases by commodity groups  Number of 
Cases  Canada US  Closed  Ongoing
 
Fruits & Vegetables  15  12  3  15   
Other
1  12 6  6  10  2 
Pigs/Poultry   9  5  4  9   
Grains 8  3  5  5  3 
Cattle 5  3  2  4  1 
Dairy 2    2  1  1 
Multi-commodity   2  1  1  1  1 
Total 53  30  23  45  8 
1 Other includes Beer, Sugar, Baby food. The listing of 53 cases, rather than the 30 in the previous table, 
reflects the fact that several disputes went through multiple stages. Issues of who initiated the case, whether 
it was resolved and what it entailed require the stages to be kept separate  
If the reason for the conflict reflects market shares, this should show up in the type of 
dispute. Table 4.3 classifies the trade actions by whether they are anti-dumping or 
countervail cases (brought by importers) or complaints about subsidies and market access 
(brought by the exporter). Eighty-five percent of all bilateral agricultural trade actions are 
importer-initiated disputes charging dumping or claiming the right to countervail against 
subsidies in the exporting country. Ninety-three percent of all Canadian cases are of this 
nature. The US complaints also were predominantly import-related (74 percent) though   33 
more complaints involved market access (13 percent) and export or import-displacing 
subsidies (9 percent). Thus the picture emerges of Canadian complaints about imports of 
products from the United States dominating any concerns about access into the US 
market or US behaviour in third markets, while US complaints included both objections 
to Canadian exports into the US market and into third markets as well as import 
restrictions and subsidies reducing access into the Canadian market.  
Table 4.3: Classification of US-Canada Bilateral Trade disputes in Agriculture by 
Issue 
Brought by  Resolved Check)  Type of Case  Total 
Canada US  Closed  Ongoing 
Anti-dumping, countervail  45  28  17  42  3 
Export subsidies, subsidies  2    2  1  1 
Market Access, tariffs and TRQs, SPS 
and TBT 
5 2  3  3  2 
State Trading and Supply Management  1    1    1 
Total 53  30  23  46  7 
Source: Annex B 
 
Can one make any generalizations about the way in which disputes have been resolved 
and the institutional venue of such complaints? Table 4.4 classifies the 53 actions by the 
institution that ruled on the case (national, bilateral or trilateral, or multilateral) and the 
outcome of the action.
16 Of the 45 anti-dumping and countervail cases, for which 
institutional level and outcome are most relevant, a trade rule violation was found in 44 
percent of the actions, the “success rate” being slightly higher in those cases brought by 
the United States (47 percent) than in Canadian-initiated cases (43 percent). Trade 
violations were more readily found at the national level (the USITC and the CITT), 
where 54 percent of all actions favoured the complaining country. When these actions 
were referred to the CUSTA or NAFTA level (as appropriate) only 35 percent of the 
actions were upheld, though 55 percent of such referrals proved either inconclusive or 
were terminated by the complaining party before a decision was reached. In terms of 
absolute numbers, Canadian actions exposed twelve violations by the United States, and 
US actions discovered eight trade rule violations by Canada. Twenty-two such cases 
found either no violation, resulted in inconclusive judgments, or were withdrawn.  
                                                 
16 Only the 45 anti-dumping and countervail actions are included in this table.    34 
Table 4.4: Breakdown of Antidumping and Countervailing cases by institutional level and 
dispute outcomes 
Outcome of Cases  Brought by  Institutional level 






GATT   
Trade Violation: Found  22 13  9 15  7     
Trade Violation: Not Found  9 6  3 7  2     
Inconclusive/ Terminated early  11  8  3   11    
Pending  3 1  2 2    1   
Total  45 28  17 24  20  1   
Source: Annex B 
Discussion of specific trade disputes. 
Wheat 
Prior to the implementation of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in 1989 there were 
important non-tariff barriers in wheat that effectively prevented significant trade between 
the two countries in this commodity. However, the CUSTA introduced measures that 
resulted in a dropping of these barriers by the early 1990s. Since that point there has been 
a rapid expansion of trade, particularly in Canadian wheat exports to the U.S. From 1984 
to 1990 Canadian wheat exports to the U.S. averaged 12 million bushels per year. From 
1992-1999 these exports averaged 56 million per year, representing a compound growth 
rate of 21 percent per year from the first period to the second. With opening the border 
came a parade of trade disputes. These disputes arose early on from the growth in 
Canadian exports to the United States, but disputes seem to have stemmed also in part 
due to the distrust in the United States over the activities of the Canadian Wheat Board 
(CWB), which has a monopoly on wheat exports from the Canadian prairie. There has 
been persistent offensive action by the U.S. and a spirited defence by Canada and by the 
CWB in particular. 
The first case was not directly related to the CWB. In 1989 the United States launched a 
claim against Canada under the CUSTA, arguing that Canada’s freight subsidies under 
the Canadian Transportation Authority (the “Crow Rates”) were an export subsidy for 
durum wheat exports to the United States. Resolution of the case required that Canada 
amend its freight subsidy so that it was not triggered by shipments destined for the U.S.  
Three years later the U.S. filed another case under CUSTA against Canadian durum 
wheat exports, charging that with the help of subsidies they were being sold below cost. 
The CUSTA Panel found no compelling evidence that the Canadian Wheat Board was 
selling at prices below its acquisition cost.  
A third case was brought by the U.S. to the USITC under Section 22 (of the U.S. 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933) in 1994, focusing on all wheat imports. The 
argument was that imports into the U.S. were materially interfering with a US farm   35 
support program, in this case the price support and deficiency payment program for 
wheat. The key issue was the magnitude of the US price impact of Canadian imports and 
thus the magnitude of additional outlay under the support programs of the time. Canada 
presented economic simulation model evidence that the shipments to the United States 
had only modest price effects because they comprised a small share of the US wheat 
market and, more fundamentally, with most of Canadian and US wheat exported out of 
North America, prices were determined in a global market. Since, Canadian wheat would 
still compete with US wheat in other markets if it were not shipped to the United States, 
the price impact of where the competition occurred must be small. The US countered by 
ignoring the global nature of wheat markets and arguing that in short run price response 
models even modest supply shocks were associated with large price changes. The six 
commissioners in the case were split, three arguing no interference, one arguing for a 
modest tariff and two arguing for relatively tight tariff-rate quotas. The outcome was that 
the two countries came to a negotiated settlement for the 1994/95 crop year with Canada 
agreeing to limit its wheat exports to the U.S. 
In 2001, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) initiated a Section 301 
investigation of the CWB. The USTR concluded that CWB practices violated various 
GATT articles on national treatment (Art.1) and denied trading partners adequate 
opportunity to compete for sales or purchases (Art 17).  After this finding, the United 
States filed a WTO complaint and a dispute settlement proceeding was initiated early in 
2003. In February 2004, a WTO dispute settlement panel ruled against the main claim 
that the CWB export behaviour was fundamentally in violation of the GATT. However, 
the panel also ruled that the Canada did discriminate against imports in its grain handling 
system. At this date neither party has stated whether they would appeal the rulings.   
Finally, in 2002 the North Dakota Wheat Commission and the U.S. Durum Growers 
Association (also based in North Dakota) brought countervailing and anti-dumping 
petitions against the CWB for both durum and other spring wheat. The US Department of 
Commerce found support for dumping and subsidy (which it does in almost every case) 
but the USITC split in its determination of injury. The USITC found that subsidized 
Canadian imports injured the US hard red spring wheat industry but failed to injure the 
US durum wheat industry. The CWB and the government of Canada filed an appeal in 
November 2003 with a NAFTA panel disputing both the magnitude of the duties and the 
finding of injury for hard read spring wheat. The North Dakota Wheat Commission also 
stated that they planned to file an appeal. A decision by the NAFTA panel will be 
forthcoming in about 18 months from that date. 
Underlying Issues 
There appear to be a variety of underlying issues here. First there is the development of 
new trading relationships that only started after the North American market was opened 
under CUSTA. Second, in the early-mid 1990s the U.S. export subsidy program (EEP) 
opened up profitable opportunities for Canadian wheat to fill openings in U.S. markets. 
Third, with the removal of the Canadian wheat freight subsidy in 1996-1997, north-south 
trade was encouraged instead of all wheat exports moving west. At the same time there 
are the simple facts that in an open market it may make good business sense for   36 
transportation, quality and other reasons to source grain from anywhere on the continent 
in the absence of trade barriers. The familiar conditions for a demand for increased 
protection arising during periods of low prices and import surges applies to Canada-US 
trade in wheat as it does for other commodities.  However, what appears to run through 
these disputes in wheat more than periodic surges in imports and declines in prices is 
strongly-held suspicions in part of the US wheat industry, in particular in North Dakota, 
that the Canadian Wheat Board somehow provides unfair competition which hurts US 
interests.  
What possible solutions are there to this long series of disputes? Obviously a unilateral 
retreat from a one-desk seller by Canada by allowing competing sellers to enter the 
market would at least change the focus of the disputes and the rhetoric. If, however, 
opening the export trade to less active management resulted in increased exports to the 
United States, we suspect that the North Dakota Wheat Commission would object just as 
strongly as they do now against the CWB. If the activities of the CWB were restricted by 
a multilateral agreement in WTO negotiations, this might remove the same elements that 
bother Northern wheat interests in the United States. Another solution could come from a 
clear and forceful ruling from a NAFTA panel or the WTO that the US cases were 
unfounded. In the short to intermediate term, however, none of these options appear 
likely, which is to say that further wheat disputes may be part of the trade landscape in 
agriculture between Canada and the U.S. for some time.   
Corn 
This case concerned a rather small market in Canada, the corn market in the Prairies, 
centred on Manitoba.
17 Manitoba corn growers filed anti-dumping and countervailing 
duty actions against US corn imports in August 2000. The case shows how a 
neighbouring market can be affected by subsidies. It also shows what can happen when 
farmers in such a regional market try to deal with the price depressing effects of those 
subsidies using trade remedy procedures using “regional” rules of injury rather than the 
more usual national rules.  
The case was precipitated by the subsidy granted to US corn growers that Canadian 
growers claimed depressed corn prices on the Canadian prairies. The two markets are 
highly integrated so that price transmission is rapid and price levels are approximately 
equal. The combined duty in the final determination was US$1.30 per bushel when 
market prices at the time were approximately US$1.80 per bushel. However, the injury 
test was concluded negatively in the final determination in March 2001. Part of the 
reason for this is that “regional” standards were applied which required not just that 
material injury was caused by US corn subsidies, but that injury was found “to all or 
almost all producers” in the prairie region, interpreted to mean 95 percent. This is 
relevant because a sizeable minority of corn-growing farmers were involved in a mixed 
livestock-wheat enterprise in which case lower corn prices would injured their whole-
                                                 
17 This section draws heavily on a paper that deals with this case in some detail, R.M.A. Loyns, “Manitoba 
Corn Growers Association Inc. vs. U.S. Corn Exports,” in Loyns, Meilke, Knutson and Yunez-Naude, 
Trade Remedy Laws and Canada-U.S. Trade Relations, Winnipeg, MB: Friesen Press, 2003.   37 
farm operations much less if at all. The other reason for the finding of no injury is that 
rigid legal or administrative definitions were used, notably ignoring opportunity costs, as 
is common in applications of trade remedy law.  
The conclusions that arise from this case are first that the use of trade remedy law, such 
as countervails, to deal with high levels of domestic support in a trading partner where 
markets are relatively integrated, are difficult especially not in a regional setting. Further, 
the thresholds for judging injury in a regional, not national, setting, at least as interpreted 
in Canada, make it almost impossible to find injury. Third, trade remedy law as widely 
practiced does not apply economic logic and evidence as generally used by economists 
This is not news to anyone reviewing the litany of trade disputes between Canada and the 
United States 
Dairy Border Disputes 
The dairy industry has long been one of the most contentious areas of border relations in 
agriculture between the two countries. Contention goes back many years and was 
renewed with the Uruguay Round Agreement which was implemented in 1995. Prior 
tothat time, there were fewer explicit disputes because dairy policy in each country was, 
by mutual agreement, left unchanged by the NAFTA and the prior CUSTA. And prior to 
the introduction of supply management in mid-1970s, there were relatively few border 
impediments and farm prices were comparable. 
One exception to this pre-1995 peace at the border was the ice cream and yogurt case 
brought by the U.S. against Canada in 1988. At issue was Canada’s unilateral decision to 
include ice cream and yogurt on Canada’s import control list, making them subject to 
import quota restrictions instead of being regulated only by tariffs. The U.S. won this 
case. Canada could not unilaterally change import quotas into tariffs. However, Canada’s 
response came only after the Uruguay Round Agriculture Agreement (URAA) was 
signed, by converting these quotas into tariffs, just as it did for all dairy products as part 
of the implementation of the URAA in 1995. This “reverse tariffication” was not done to 
previous the tariff levels but to considerably higher tariffs, following Canada’s 
interpretation of the Uruguay Round tariffication procedures.  
The second dispute, the first to follow NAFTA and the URAA, concerned this process of 
tariffication of import restrictions as part of the implementation of the URAA, brought by 
the U.S. against Canada in 1996. The issue was whether the NAFTA or the URAA had 
priority in the setting of tariffs. They were set as part of the URAA to replace quantitative 
import restrictions, but the NAFTA procedure was to reduce all tariffs to zero, following 
a ten-year implementation period. In addition, the new tariffs were higher than tariffs 
agreed to under the NAFTA provisions. The U.S. argued that the NAFTA required no 
increase in tariffs and conformity with the established time-period for tariff reductions, 
whereas Canada argued that the URAA had priority and that NAFTA provisions did not 
apply prospectively to any new tariff introductions. This dispute covered more than dairy 
products, but also a substitute for butter, margarine, as well at poultry products that are 
also part of the supply management regime. The ruling supported the Canadian position, 
that the URAA provision had priority over NAFTA procedures and requirements.   38 
The third dispute arose from a complaint brought by the U.S., in 1998, and it dealt with 
the implementation by Canada of the tariff rate quota for fluid milk. Instead of specifying 
a quota level and giving some trading firm the right to import that quantity of fluid milk, 
Canada implicitly gave this right to individual consumers who were buying fluid milk in 
the U.S. and bringing it into Canada. The amount of milk actually imported depended on 
how much consumers would choose to bring back, and the quantity imported was 
calculated by consumer responses to a sample survey. The U.S. took issue with this 
unconventional procedure and brought this dispute to the WTO. However, the WTO 
decided in Canada’s favour by accepting this procedure for managing the its TRQs. 
In late 1997, the United States (with New Zealand joining in early 1998, brought a 
complaint against Canada for subsidizing its milk product exports. This case, through all 
its appeals was to run for five years and has only recently been settled. The United States 
and New Zealand argued that some of Canada’s categories for pricing industrial milk (the 
“special milk classes”) created following the Uruguay Round involved an export subsidy 
and that this violated Canada’ commitments under the URAA. These different categories 
arise from the practice of price discrimination, setting different raw milk prices for 
different end uses, a practice that is also used in U.S. milk marketing orders, and most of 
this industrial milk is sold for domestic consumption. However, when these milk products 
are exported, as they increasingly were during the post-1995 period, such pricing 
practices raised the possibility of an implicit export subsidy. Existing export subsidies 
were not banned for agricultural goods in the Uruguay Round, but new ones were and 
Canada did not notify its trading partners that it had any export subsidies on milk 
products. The price of milk to be paid by processors for these special export classes was 
below the price of milk applied to products consumed domestically, and the United States 
and New Zealand claimed that this constituted the export subsidy.  
Canada argued that this was not a direct subsidy, since it was neither funded nor paid 
directly by the Government of Canada. Therefore, the scheme was not subject to the 
export subsidy disciplines. The WTO Panel and Appellate Body both disagreed and 
decided in 1999 that it was a direct export subsidy and that Canada was in violation of its 
commitments. Canada’s response was to reform its export pricing practices, introducing 
the Commercial Export Mechanism (CEM). Although the details varied by province, this 
regime involved individual producers contracting directly with processors and not subject 
to the intervention of the national supply management system. As such, it was expected 
to be WTO-legal.  
However, New Zealand and the United States challenged this new policy in 2001 with a 
request for a compliance panel, arguing that Canada had maintained its export subsidy by 
virtue of a cross-subsidy from higher prices on the domestic market and that the 
government was still involved in orchestrating the scheme. The WTO Panel in July 2001 
supported these contentions and ruled that Canada was still subsidizing milk product 
exports and therefore in violation of its commitments. Canada appealed once more but 
this time the Appellate Body was unable to make a finding because it ruled that the 
Compliance Panel had used an incorrect price standard to analyze whether there was a 
payment (export subsidy) or not.    39 
In early 2002, the United States and New Zealand requested that the compliance panel re-
hear the case using the more appropriate data. This time the compliance panel ruled in 
favour of the United States and New Zealand, that Canada was continuing to subsidize 
exports. Canada appealed and the final decision of the Appellate Body was made in 
December 2002 against Canada. The economics used to arrive at the of the WTO 
decision are interesting. The panel argued that to compare export prices to costs, one 
should examine industry-wide average costs, not only costs for exporting farmers. The 
panel argued that if costs for product exported are lower than the calculated production 
costs for the industry average, then the loss must have been made up with profits from 
elsewhere in the system, namely those earned on domestic sales. This constitutes a cross-
subsidy and must be removed as an illegal export subsidy. This economic reasoning is 
odd on both counts, but is already being cited in other WTO cases. It seems to imply that 
any export sales at prices lower than average domestic prices may be subject to a charge 
of export subsidies. Nonetheless, the ruling is final and Canada must adjust its policies 
accordingly.  
Summary 
Few of the border disputes between the two countries are as deep-seated as is the case in 
dairy. One of the reasons for the extent and nature of these disputes is that Canada 
erected such obviously high barriers in the form of over-TRQ tariffs in excess of 300 
percent when the URAA was initially implemented, inviting challenges. Then its milk 
product exports grew very rapidly in percentage terms, partly due to export subsidies 
through some kinds of revenue pooling. On the other side of the table, the United States. 
(and New Zealand) are suspicious of the Canadian dairy policy regime which they 
believe to be open to manipulation in ways contrary to WTO disciplines, the common 
argument lodged against state trading enterprises. At least as important, the United States 
(and New Zealand) believes it has a more efficient dairy industry and that Canadian dairy 
import barriers are costing it large foregone export sales. Finally, the United States and 
New Zealand were persistant in the WTO export case because the Canadian example 
might have been used by the EU and that would have had much larger implications for 
world dairy and other commodity markets.  
With all these factors at work, the United States has been persistent in bringing dairy 
complaints against Canada, and the Canadian response has been equally aggressive. 
Neither side appears ready to compromise. The U.S. is unlikely to accept the Canadian 
regime, until it is dismantled. It is equally unlikely that the Canadian reaction to these 
challenges will be anything but combative. It is unlikely that we have seen the end to 
disputes on dairy trade.  
Possible Solutions 
What possible resolutions could there be to this area of dispute? The most obvious path to 
resolution would be for Canada to relax key elements of its supply management policy. 
Two avenues could be followed. In fact, because these are the two critical border policy 
levers in this industry, an agreement would almost certainly require some degree of 
change in one or the other, or both.    40 
First, Canada could lower its over-TRQ tariffs. At present, they are in the range of 200-
300 percent, but there is a huge amount of “water” in those tariffs. They could probably 
be lowered to around 25-35 percent without resulting in any significant increase in 
imports. Even lower tariffs and a schedule of further reduction, which would allow 
imports to flow would be required to truly resolve the underlying concern that dairy (and 
a few other supply management commodity categories) were left out of CUSTA 
liberalization.  
The second avenue would be to give the U.S. greater access to the Canadian market via 
an increase in Canada’s tariff rate quotas for dairy products. The level of access that 
would be necessary to obtain an agreement is unclear, but it would probably have to be 
significant and also include a schedule of future TRQ increases.  
Both options would leave the supply management scheme in place in a mechanical sense, 
but they ultimately would remove most of its benefits. The tariff reduction route would 
lower domestic milk prices once the tariff reaches something like 25-30 percent. The 
level of the value of the Canadian dollar would be a critical factor in following this route. 
The increase in TRQ levels would not result in much change in Canadian prices initially 
if the domestic quota were reduced as imports increased but would involve an almost 
equivalent loss of marketing quotas to Canadian farmers. This would transfer economic 
benefits from the supply management system from Canadian quota owners to either 
importers or U.S. exporters. These changes in supply management would be resisted very 
strongly by the Canadian dairy lobby, and almost surely by the Canadian government. Of 
course, both tariff reductions and import quota expansion are likely to be a part of the 
current Doha Round of multilateral WTO negotiations. Whatever agreement is struck 
there will be critical to the negotiating options that would be available in any bilateral 
discussions to address these dispute areas.  
Clearly, if some deal were to be worked out along these lines, it must involve some kind 
of added elements that would benefit Canada. These could be benefits to other sectors of 
Canadian agriculture. Another trade benefit might be some guarantee of access for the 
Canadian dairy industry to export into the U.S. market without harassment. A further 
element of such an agreement might be some direct compensation by the Canadian 
government to the Canadian dairy industry. This could be some kind of direct cash 
benefit on a per farm, per cow or per litre of milk production basis, or it could take the 
form of a government buyout of farmers’ marketing quotas. The Canadian dairy industry 
has already stated that if there is to be some dismantling of the supply management 
policy, there will also have to be some kind of compensation. There is ample precedent 
for such compensation measures, mostly recently with the removal of the Crow Rate 
subsidy of grain freight transportation costs to grain farmers in the Prairies, but also with 
grape growers who were hurt by the change in their effective border protection from the 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (see below). 
Fruits and Vegetables 
The horticultural sector is one of the most active areas of trade between Canada and the 
U.S., accounting for the largest amount of agricultural imports into Canada from the 
United States. Canada also exports some horticultural commodities to the United States.   41 
Competition has led to several disputes, most of which related to claims of unfair 
subsidization or dumping.  
Red Delicious Apples 
There is a long history of free trade in apples between the United States and Canada, but 
in 1989 Canada claimed that the U.S., specifically growers in Washington State, were 
dumping Red Delicious apples into Canada. For the season in question, there was bumper 
crop and apple prices in both countries fell substantially. Large quantities of apples were 
exported from Washington to Canada, and export prices were below normal production 
costs. This met one of the tests for dumping. In addition, these trade flows injured 
Canadian apple producers, given the large production in Washington State. As a result 
dumping duties were imposed despite the fact that Washington state producers were 
simply marketing a bumper crop following normal market procedures and treating the 
Canadian market no differently than they treated the market in the United States A 
similar case in 1994 also resulted in an anti-dumping duty being levied until it was finally 
removed in 2000.  
The apple anti-dumping duties lasted about a decade, but the case does not represent a 
permanent area of dispute. The Canadian industry used the situations of large bumper 
crops opportunistically for ”temporary” relief from lower prices.  There have been no 
further anti-dumping claims in apples since 1994. This case does illustrate the weakness 
of the economics of anti-dumping remedy in agricultural industries subject to 
uncontrollable production and price variation.  
Greenhouse and Fresh Field Tomatoes 
Recently resolved cases dealing with fresh market tomatoes occurred in 2001-2002. First 
the US industry and then the Canadian industry claimed dumping on the part of the 
industry on the other side of the border.  
The U.S. case claimed that greenhouse tomatoes from Canada were dumped into the 
United States. In this case a critical issue concerned whether the “like product” was only 
greenhouse tomatoes or included all fresh tomatoes (field and greenhouse). Canadian 
exports had a significant share of the greenhouse tomato sales but a tiny share of all fresh 
tomatoes sold in the United States. As often occurs, Canadian exporters were found to 
have dumped their product on the U.S. market during the 2000 through 2001 period. 
However, USITC determined that all fresh tomatoes were the relevant like product and 
concluded that exports of Canadian greenhouse tomatoes had not injured U.S. greenhouse 
growers.  
The Canadian case, lodged a few months after the US case was brought, was against 
fresh field tomato exports to Canada. Once again dumping was found but not material 
injury. This case then took an unexpected turn near its conclusion. The Canadian tomato 
industry complainants withdrew their complaint and requested that proceedings on this 
case be terminated. This occurred two months after the U.S. case had been decided 
against a dumping charge on Canadian greenhouse tomatoes. It is hard to interpret this 
result as anything other than indicating that the Canadian complaint against the U.S. was   42 
a case of tit for tat. Both cases were closed by these decisions and the dispute apparently 
has ended. 
Other horticultural cases 
Most other horticultural cases over the last two decades involved anti-dumping, or 
countervail. An exception is the closing of the US border to PEI potatoes due to an SPS 
problem.  
One of the earliest cases, filed in 1984, dealt with dumping and subsidy of raspberries 
from Canada A provincial subsidy program in British Columbia but the countervail case 
was suspended without a final determination. The anti-dumping case was decided with an 
affirmative ruling and dumping duties remained in force until 1999. A longer term impact 
was that many of these provincial subsidy programs were ended or modified so as not to 
trigger countervails. 
Anti-dumping cases involving whole potatoes, yellow onions, sour cherries, and iceberg 
lettuce were brought by Canadian producers against the U.S. between 1984 and 1992, and 
all resulted in anti-dumping duties being levied for an average of ten years. Two other 
cases, concerning cauliflower and tomato paste were brought in the 1992-93 period, again 
by Canada, but denied on the basis of a negative injury determination.  
Conclusion 
The horticultural sector has seen a variety of mainly countervail and antidumping 
disputes over the past 20 years. Canada initiated the majority of the cases, in the mid-
1980s to early 1990s. The timing of these cases suggests that the exchange rate has 
played a role. The number of Canada-initiated horticultural cases peaked at about the 
same time as did the value of the Canadian dollar. Only a few cases have been filed since 
the mid-1990s when the Canadian dollar depreciated in value. Some cases resulted in 
change in marketing practices or government policies to remove the offending actions. 
None of the cases developed into serious on-going conflicts, as has been the case in 
wheat and dairy.  
Are there any lessons that can be learned to alleviate these conflicts? The most obvious 
issue is that prevailing anti-dumping legislation is pre-disposed to affirmative findings 
when applied to the agricultural sector. Some tightening up of anti-dumping provisions at 
least when applied to the agricultural sector would be appropriate; this may be a fruitful 
topic for bilateral (or trilateral) discussions in the context of NAFTA.  With the wider use 
of countervail and antidumping in the last two decades, countries and industries are 
modifying policies and marketing strategies, to reduce these types of trade restrictions 
(and legal costs). These adjustments by themselves will lead to a lower incidence of these 
kinds of disputes, but are costly to consumers, producers and reduce gains from trade. 
Live Cattle and Beef 
Cattle and beef have flowed in both directions across the border between the United 
States and Canada. For many years the cattle trade was limited by animal health issues 
and disagreements between agencies on each side of the border. Expansion of seasonal   43 
feeder cattle movements in the 1990s was joined by the shipments of slaughter cattle 
shipped south because the cattle production in Canada exceeded slaughter capacity and 
the rapid technical change and consolidation in the US beef processing industry 
encouraged shipments from Canada. This expanded trade led to a petition for 
antidumping and countervailing duty relief from a relatively small group of cattle 
producers, Ranchers-cattlemen Action Legal Fund (R-CALF), in 1998. 
The R-CALF case did not get the support of the mainstream organization in the industry, 
the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, and was primarily driven by Western border 
state cattle interests. The R-CALF rhetoric was also directed as much against the large 
beef packers as the Canadian industry. Early in 1999, the case passed preliminary injury 
test. The DOC applied a dumping duty of about 5 percent but declined to apply a 
countervailing duty. With this small dumping duty and a market share in the United 
States of only three or four percent, the USITC found no injury in its final decision. A 
further factor in this case was that beef trade was not an issue and the market for beef 
remained open and duty free. Basic economics suggests that taxing trade in an input 
while trade in the final product is open can have only minimal affects on the price of the 
input and thus could be of only minimal benefit to the cattle ranchers. The reasoning is 
simply that with the beef market fully integrated, a tax on live cattle could only affect 
where the cattle are slaughtered and would not affect the supply of or demand for beef. 
An integrated beef market makes it impossible for US cattlemen to gain from blocking 
cattle trade. It is not clear that this economic point was influential in the USITC 
deliberations, but it added to the sense that the case was not a winner for the US industry. 
Although the Canadian cattle industry was completely vindicated, the case cost the 
industry almost C$5 million and the industry pledged to work for more reasonable rules 
on dumping in the NAFTA context.  
No further dumping or countervail actions have occurred in the cattle industry, but trade 
was totally blocked in May 2003 by the finding of a lone case of Bovine Spongiform 
Encepholopathy (BSE) in Alberta. Then in December 2003 a case of BSE was found in 
Washington State that was subsequently traced back to a herd of origin also in Alberta. 
Both of the cases were identified in older cattle that had been exposed to feed prior to 
changes in feed content rules in Canada in 1997. Neither the United States nor Canada 
has settled on appropriate trade policy in these cases. Third countries, particularly Japan 
and Korea, which are major export markets for both the United States and Canada have 
blocked beef exports from both countries and regaining this access is considered 
especially important. The bilateral beef trade was also initially blocked, but it has 
recovered with the acceptance that there is no threat in meat from younger animals. 
Hogs and Pork 
Multiple conflicts concerning hogs and pork extend back to 1984 and primarily involve 
countervail claims by the United States. Two separate countervail petitions, in 1984 and 
1989, covered live hogs and pork, led to multiple appeals, the first bi-national panels 
under CUSTA, two extraordinary challenges, a GATT dispute panel, twelve 
administrative reviews, and an amendment to the U.S. Tariff Act. The duties on fresh, 
chilled and frozen pork were revoked in 1991 and the countervailing duties on live hogs   44 
ended on January 1, 2000 following a sunset review. In March 2004, the National Pork 
Producers filed yet another round of anti-dumping and subsidy claims and the case is 
proceeding through the US Department of Commerce and the USITC and will likely go 
through several stages during 2004 and perhaps early 2005.The triggering of these 
disputes follows a typical pattern  Hog prices were at a cyclical low in 1983 and 84 and 
the Canadian dollar had depreciated. As a result U.S. hog prices were low and Canadian 
exports were expanding substantially. In 1984 live hog imports were three times those of 
1983, and pork imports were 36 percent higher than in 1983.  
The Canadian export surge also reflected two sources, a rapid expansion of Canadian 
production and diversion of Canadian exports to the U.S. from third country markets. 
Danish exports to the Japanese market were returning after an earlier health problem, and 
Canadian exports to Japan were re-directed to the U.S. market. US pork producers also 
claimed that Canadian hog stabilization programs, federal and provincial, subsidized 
production in Canada.  
Specific Disputes  
Claims of subsidy and the request for countervailing duties by the US National Pork 
Producers Council were accepted by the US Commerce Department and duties were 
imposed. However, the USITC found no injury to the domestic hog and pork industry 
from pork imports and removed that CVD.
18 This left the hog CVD in place, a duty of 
Cdn$0.044/lb live weight on live swine. Pork exports from Canada subsequently 
increased, and in a follow-up case, twenty-two parties petitioned for a countervailing duty 
for pork in 1989. The Department of Commerce once again found that five Canadian 
pork subsidies were countervailable. This time the USITC voted in favour of U.S. 
producers, and duties remained in effect until the ruling was revoked on appeal. 
Both the hog and pork rulings were appealed to a CUSTA panel in 1989. In the case of 
live hogs, the panel broadly affirmed the USITC findings of injury but questioned some 
of the procedures used to determine the impact of the subsidy. The United States 
challenged the procedure and requested an Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC) 
hearing. The ECC, however, found against the United States and dismissed the action.. In 
the pork case, the review challenged the DOC’s finding of subsidy with respect to several 
of the Canadian federal and provincial programs (10 out of 18 in the original DOC 
determination). The DOC had found that subsidies provided to swine producers confer 
benefits on pork processors, and had used a conversion factor that allocated all of the 
alleged subsidies to only a portion of the swine. The panels affirmed (in part) that the 
benefits constituted subsidies; but remanded (in part) the issue of the conversion factor 
and the inclusion of several of the programs. A further request was made for a CUSTA 
panel to consider the determination of injury to US pork producers. The panel decided 
that the USITC had depended on “questionable” statistics, and this had influenced its 
decision. The United States challenged the procedure and once again requested an 
Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC) hearing. The ECC, however, found against 
                                                 
18 The duty was revoked as a result of a Sunset review in 11/04/1999. The review argued that the revocation of this 
order would not be likely to lead to the continuation or recurrence of a countervailable subsidy. The revocation order 
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the United States and affirmed the decision of the CUSTA panel. This effectively ended 
the countervail action on pork in 1991. 
The conflict over the import of live hogs into the United States was revived after the 
NAFTA came into effect. In 1994, Canada requested a NAFTA panel to examine the 
certain technical procedures of the USITC in coming to its injury decision on the extent 
of countervailing duties. The NAFTA panel provided a complex ruling that required the 
USITC to adjust some procedures specific to this case.
19  
Not all the action in the hog and pork markets was confined to countervail and anti-
dumping actions. In 1985, five states banned hog imports from Canada in 1985 (Cohn, 
p.154) on grounds that a potentially harmful antibiotic (chloramphenicol) was being used. 
The ban was removed after discussions with the federal authorities. Canada maintained a 
ban on live hog imports from the United States on health grounds (contending that there 
was a risk of importing the disease pseudorabies). Moreover, the structure of the industry 
was changing rapidly, with consolidation of farm production and slaughter facilities on 
both sides of the border. The relative peace in the sector since the 1990s has probably 
reflected the benefits of this reorganization, as well as the disciplines afforded by the 
WTO Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. However, the 2004 case may 
bring back the contentions of two decades earlier  
Results 
These disputes followed periods of import surges into the U.S. market in the presence of 
Canadian subsidy programs. In the case of the pork countervails, the USITC did rule that 
the Canadian policy actions were not injuring the U.S. industry. That this ruling did not 
extend to live hogs provoked considerable subsequent research, with the conclusion that 
injury was also unlikely in live hogs.
20 Given the small size of the Canadian exports 
relative to the size of the U.S. market, any injury would likely be small. 
These disputes did not involve fundamental policy differences or system incompatibility. 
Rather they revolve around the ability to appeal to trade remedy law when prices decline 
and the competitor across the border increases shipments.  
These cases did lead to changes, especially within Canada. First, hog prices were lower, 
more variable and more uncertain. This led to slower growth of the hog industry in 
Canada in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, compared to rapid growth in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. Over the period from 1985 to the early 1990s hog exports stagnated, in 
contrast to other agricultural exports over this period. Subsequently, after the successful 
challenge of the pork countervail and the reductions in the hog countervailing duty rate, 
exports resumed and grew quickly. From 1988 to 1998, agricultural exports in total grew 
by 275 percent (Rattray, 2001). Over that period, hog exports increased by 334 percent, 
mostly during the 1990s. However, pork exports grew by only 30 percent. There is some 
                                                 
19 Further details of these cases are included in Annex A. 
20 H. Bruce Huff, Hog and Pork Countervail: Lessons, Implications, and Future Strategies. A report 
prepared for the Canadian Pork Council. July 2001. Karl D. Meilke and Giancarlo Moschini, A Chronicle 
of Canadian Hog Stabilization Programs and U.S. Countervailing Duties on Hogs and Pork. Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State University, GATT Research Paper 91-GATT5, 1992.   46 
evidence that competitiveness of hog processing in Canada with the U.S. declined with 
less investment due to uncertainty over the countervailing and anti-dumping duties. 
However after the successful resolution of the disputes , processing investment increased 
rapidly.  
These hog and pork cases also affected Canadian policy. First, Canadian stabilization 
programs were modified over the late 1980s and 1990s, specifically to reduce the risk of 
countervail. The program for hogs, the National Tripartite Stabilization Program, was 
eliminated in 1994, and replaced by the Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA) 
program. The countervailing duties were, in effect, taxing away all the benefits of these 
stabilization programs anyway (Cluff et al). In fact, these actions were not only disruptive 
of trade flows but also very costly to all participants in the Canadian industry in terms of 
direct legal costs, lost export opportunities, and greatly increased uncertainty. Therefore, 
avoiding future countervails was most important, with the result that stabilization 
programs in Canada (e.g., the NISA program) have become cross-commodity, insurance-
type programs designed to be categorized as “generally available,” “not countervailable” 
and belonging in the “green box.” Another result was a series of studies to examine how 
much these programs could have affected the U.S. price, hence injury to U.S. producers. 
The consensus of these studies was that the increased Canadian production due to the 
stabilization programs would have had an insignificant effect on U.S. hog prices, even if 
all the production increase were exported to the U.S. (Schmitz et al, 2003). If injury to 
U.S. producers from Canada was minimal, the real explanation for declines in U.S. hog 
prices lay elsewhere.  
The 2004 case ended the hope that hog and pork border disputes were over. The situation 
seems to repeat much of the 1984 and 1989 scenarios, with the new anti-dumping charge 
being the only change. Canadian live hog exports to the U.S. market accounted for about 
7 percent of U.S. production in 2003, but this represents an increase of 35 percent in the 
last two years, from an export market share of about 5 percent in 2001. This small export 
market share would seem unlikely to result in any significant price effects in the large 
U.S. market, hence little injury, but the results of these investigations are not always as 
expected. Further, this case will be a test of whether the revamped Canadian stabilization 
program is really “non-countervailable,” notwithstanding the substantial efforts to make 
it so. The dumping charges are harder to predict, given that “selling below cost” is a test 
that is often not difficult to meet in the agricultural sector.  
 
Sugar 
Of the other agricultural commodities that have experienced trade conflicts, sugar 
deserves specific mention. Sugar is governed by very different policies on each side of 
the border. Canada has almost no domestic sugar production, in contrast to the 
widespread cultivation of both beet and cane sugar in the United States. The United 
States has for decades maintained a restrictive import policy for sugar. Canada has kept 
its sugar market open, importing most of its sugar demand from the Caribbean. As a 
result, sugar prices are lower north of the border. Of course, sugar is processed into a 
variety of forms and incorporated in food products. Shipment of these sugar derivatives 
(such as molasses and syrups) and high-sugar foods creates problems the US sugar   47 
protection regime Thus the tensions in the sugar market reflect the attempts by the United 
States to prevent sugar from entering through Canada in various guises.. 
The first complaint in the modern era came in 1971, when the United States complained 
about the importation of sugar and syrups from Canada. The USITC investigated and 
found trade violations. Countervailing duties were assessed, and remained in effect until 
December 2000. Sugar featured again in the CUSTA, when products containing less than 
10 percent by weight of sugar were exempted from US import quotas. NAFTA preserved 
the split in the sugar market by excluding US-Canada (and Canada-Mexico) trade from 
the “single market.” But the peace was shattered by the surge in sugar-containing 
products in the late 1990s, leading to a reclassification by the United States of certain 
products. Canada protested this decision, and took the dispute to the WTO. 
A somewhat different sugar dispute erupted in 1995, when Canadian sugar refiners 
(represented by the Canadian Sugar Institute) complained that refined sugar was being 
dumped by the United States (as well as other countries) on the domestic market. The 
CITT investigated and confirmed the alleged dumping, finding that there was the threat 
of material injury to the industry. The decision was reviewed in 2000, and was confirmed 
at that time. Meanwhile, the United States exporters asked for a NAFTA panel to 
consider the action, but the panel broadly affirmed the CITT decision. 
Wine 
The initial wine dispute arose in the 1980s from the practice in Canada of provincial 
liquor boards charging a higher wholesale/retail mark-up for imported wines. This 
apparent violation of the national treatment article of the GATT constituted the basis for 
the dispute and was also a concern of the European Union.  
However, this was handled within the negotiations of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement when Canada agreed to end the practice. The domestic wine-grape industry 
was widely publicized as a casualty of the Free Trade Agreement. This potential political 
problem within Canada was dealt with by compensation. Grape growers who removed 
old (low quality) grape varieties and replaced them with higher quality new plantings 
received a substantial subsidy payment per acre replanted, roughly Cdn$8,000 per acre or 
approximately equal to the price wine-grape land. It was a popular program and 
effectively removed any criticism from grape growing areas about negative impacts of 
the Free Trade Agreement. This indicates how governments can deal with the political 
downside of dealing with a dispute that imposes costs on domestic producers. 
Trends in Disputes 
Have bilateral agricultural trade conflicts between the United States and Canada gotten 
worse over time? This depends on whether one counts the number of disputes initiated or 
those that are active. The date of initiation of the disputes can tell us how often trade 
conflicts are occurring. We look at the number of cases being initiated over each 5-year 
period, from 1980 to date. Second, we know how many disputes are “active” each year, 
when “active” is defined as those years between the initiation of the dispute and the year 
the dispute measures were ended. This gives us an indication, however imperfect, of the   48 
severity of trade disputes, the longevity of those cases initiated but not yet resolved or 
where some measures are still being taken, like anti-dumping duties still being applied. 
Using the first measure, there is no trend in the number of cases initiated after 1985. Prior 
to 1985 there are two cases, but in the 1985-1989 and 1990-1994 periods 7 cases were 
initiated in each period. Eight cases were initiated during 1995-1999, and in the early 
2000 period the number of cases, prorated over the whole five year period, is also 7. In 
other words, there appears to be no trend in cases initiated since 1985. 
Table 4.5: Time Pattern of Agricultural Trade Disputes 
Time Period  Number of Cases Initiated 
Number of Active Cases 
(per year) 
   1980-1984  2  1.4 
1985-1989 7  6.6 
1990-1994 7  11.2 
1995-1999 8  9.8 
2000-2002 7  7.7 
 
 
Looking at the number of disputes remaining active, we find a pattern of a small number 
of disputes in the early 1980s but this number then grows substantially in the early 1990s, 
and declines by a quarter in the period since 2000. The number of active disputes takes a 
jump in 1988 (from 1 to 4 active cases from 1980 to 1986, to 9 in 1988). Then, over the 
period from 1988 to 1999 there were 10.3 active disputes per year. Over the last 3 years, 
2000 to 2002, the number of disputes declines by one-fifth to 7.7 disputes per year. Cast 
in terms of the five year periods as was done for the number of cases initiated, the 
numbers of active cases shows a small decline since the mid-1990s.   
The data in Table 4.5 do not indicate the impact of a dispute on an industry or on 
agricultural trade. For that we would need to normalize by the amount of trade affected as 
value or volume or the size of the industry. During this whole period, from the 1980s to 
date, there has been a substantial increase in the volume and value of agricultural trade. 
The real value of agricultural trade increased by 2.4 times from 1988 to 2003. So by 
either of these absolute measures described above, the number of disputes per dollar of 
trade has declined at least by half. So there is no indication that disputes have become 
more disruptive over time; indeed, relative to the value of agricultural trade disputes have 
become substantially less disruptive over the past decade.  
5. Broader Trade Agenda Issues 
An important part of the agricultural trade relationship between Canada and the United 
States is the extent to which they reinforce or conflict with each other in matters relating 
to global and regional agricultural policies. Similarities and differences in relation to   49 
agriculture are noticeable between the United States and Canada in such fora as the 
WTO, APEC and FTAA. Disagreements weaken the position of each country and add to 
the tensions surrounding bilateral trade relations. In broad terms, the two countries share 
many common goals for the trade system in general and agricultural trade in particular. 
These are clearest when compared to the heavily protected agricultures of East Asia and 
Europe. Both share an interest in open trade relations with developing countries, and see 
world markets as a firm basis for their development. Of increasing significance is their 
common attachment to the scientific basis for health and safety regulations and they are 
two of the relatively few countries that have moved rapidly to adopt biotech crops. 
Within the WTO, the APEC, or the FTAA, Canada and the United States have generally 
been supportive of each other’s position, even if they differ in detail and sometimes 
tactics.  
The differences, though relatively small compared to the agreements, do however have a 
corrosive impact on trade relations. First, Canada is a member of the Cairns Group. 
Though the Cairns Group and the United States share some of the same general aims, it is 
difficult to escape the fact that the Group had its genesis in making sure that the United 
States and the EU could not avoid dealing with the issue of agricultural trade rules in the 
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, as they had in the two previous rounds. The 
Cairns Group orchestrated the failure of the Montreal mid-term ministerial during the 
Round (December 1988) and again disrupted the ministerial that was supposed to end the 
round, in December 1990. On both occasions the action was to prevent agriculture being 
“swept under the rug” by a deal between the EU and the United States, though in the 
1990 event the United States was aware of and strongly supportive of the Cairns group 
plan. Canada has not been always in step with the other Cairns Group members (and 
indeed often presents its own negotiating proposals separate from those of the Group) and 
those positions represent divergence from both the common Cairns position and that of 
the United States.  In the current WTO negotiations under the Doha development agenda, 
the Cairns Group has been less of a force with its developing country members joining 
with others to confront the EU and United States. This has tended to further marginalize 
the rich country Cairns group members. 
The tensions over the negotiating stance have their roots in real differences. The status of 
the Canadian Wheat Board, as was discussed above, has always been problematic for 
some influential groups in US agriculture. The Canadian supply control system and the 
high border barriers upon which it rests poses problems as well. The dairy and poultry 
sectors, in particular, are protected by high tariffs in Canada and hamper that country’s 
ability to lead toward freer trade. In turn, the United States has a protected sugar market 
that to Canada seems to undermine some of the arguments about more liberal trade. If a 
commodity so widely grown in developing countries is to be traded though restrictive 
quotas to protect high cost producers in the rich countries then the credibility of the call 
for developing countries to open up their markets is weakened. These obviously political 
trade policy constraints not only undermine the strength of US and Canadian positions in 
trade talks, but weaken the cohesion of any tentative North American trade strategy in 
agricultural products. 
The position of Canada and the United States in the current WTO agricultural talks shows 
up some of these underlying tensions. Canada has staked out a position that would reduce   50 
domestic subsidies, including those that are deemed to be minimally trade-distorting, on 
the principle that all farmers should share in subsidy cuts and that the United States has 
been giving its own farmers generous direct payments beyond the more modest reach of 
Canadian fiscal resources. By contrast the US position has been to press more for 
reduction of border measures while agreeing to cuts in the clearly trade distorting internal 
subsidies. The United States has argued to preserve the category of less trade distorting 
subsidies without imposing reductions and even to add complex subsidy categories 
designed to allow US internal supports to continue. These differences have significant 
implications for trade negotiations and for farm policy development in the two countries.  
Equally contentious is the position on tariff reductions. The proposal of the United States, 
to reduce high tariffs more than the lower ones, would directly target Canada and the 
tariffs on dairy products and poultry. Canada has strongly resisted significant cuts in 
protection to politically sensitive sectors. Though superficially in agreement on the need 
to phase out export subsidies, the United States has targeted state trading exporters 
(single desk sellers) for additional disciplines within the WTO. Canada would have 
difficulty living with such restrictions and has made it clear that the choice of marketing 
system is in the prerogative of each WTO member and that single-desk sellers do not 
violate any rule of the WTO. No doubt these differences can be reconciled in a “bargain” 
at the end of the round, but the obvious disagreements among the NAFTA partners at the 
least makes the task of countries (such as Japan, Korea and the EU) that are reluctant to 
move too fast in the direction of more liberal trade considerably easier.  
Differences on agriculture in the FTAA talks that are proceeding in parallel to those in 
the WTO have also been problematic, although the differences between the United States 
and Canada have played a minor role relative to the arguments with Brazil and other 
South American participants.
21 Canada would like to see more market opening in the 
Americas, and has been out ahead of the United States in negotiating bilateral trade pacts. 
The main tension in this area is between the United States and Brazil, a country that 
would like to expand its access to the North American market for a number of 
agricultural products, including citrus, sugar, oilseeds and poultry, but also use the FTAA 
to get a handle on internal subsidies. The United States has expressed willingness to 
include all commodities in the FTAA for border measures but that domestic policies in 
particular should be left to the WTO discussions. It seems clear that the FTAA will not be 
able to achieve internal subsidy commitments separate from the WTO, so WTO progress 
may be a precondition for strong border measure provisions (as well as strong measures 
outside of agriculture) in the FTAA. Some naturally question the US position that it will 
truly open markets for citrus juice and sugar as a part of an FTAA, but rapid tariff 
reductions are probably even more troublesome in Canada, given the importance of the 
supply management regimes to the wealth of many farmers. Thus, slowdowns of the 
WTO process may imply a slowdown in or considerable weakening of the negotiations 
for an FTAA. The tension between high commodity subsidy payments in the United 
                                                 
21 APEC discussions on agriculture are essentially on hold for the next couple of years while members take 
part on the WTO round. Though Canada and the US have taken similar stances in the APEC, in the 
direction of an open food system, no hard choices have yet had to be faced.   51 
States and high protection for supply management commodities in Canada once again are 
at the core of the contention.    52 
Table 5.1: Canadian & US Institutions Relevant to Agricultural Trade
22 
Bilateral 
Canada-US Consultative Committee on Agriculture (CCA) 
Provincial-State Advisory Group (PSAG) 
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA/FTA) Bi-national Secretariat: Canadian and US 
Sections 
Trilateral 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Secretariat: Canadian, Mexican, and US Sections 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Commission 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Committee on Agricultural Trade 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures  
Multilateral 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agricultural Committee 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Committee 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee 
‘Quad’ Group (Canada, European Union, Japan, United States) 
‘Quint’ Group (Australia, Canada, European Union, Japan, United States) 
National: Canada 
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) 
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) 
Canadian Grain Commission (CGC) 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) 
National Farm Products Council (NFPC) 
Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC) 
National: United States  
United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
United States International Trade Commission (USITC) 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) 
Source: Authors 
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Conclusion 
Agricultural trade between Canada and the United States comprises billions of dollars 
across a wide variety for products. Canada is an important source of product for many US 
industries and final consumers and Canadian customers benefit hugely from access to 
products from the United States. That said, standard commercial interests cause firms and 
industries to use the cross-border nature of this trade to raise the costs of trade and 
differences in policy systems provide scope for conflict as well. 
Casual observation may suggest there have been an abnormally large number of disputes 
originating in the food and agriculture industries, and that the situation is getting worse, 
not better. As a result, some might argue that the Government of Canada ought to do 
something to remove these irritants to smooth international relations. For example, 
continuing disputes might be an added motive to reform agricultural trade policy in 
Canada and or to initiate broad negotiations with the United States to alleviate and 
prevent a continuation of these disputes.
23  
There are many agricultural disputes relative to the size of the agricultural markets 
compared to other sectors of the economy.
24 However, this is not unique to the bilateral 
relationship and agriculture disputes are no more common in North America than they 
are with third countries.  
Furthermore, the evidence does not support the notion that agricultural trade conflicts 
have gotten worse between the two countries. The number of disputes initiated by year 
has been stable over the 1990s and the 2000-2002 period. If one looks at the number of 
disputes that are still running or active, they peaked in the first half of the 1990s and have 
declined slightly since then. Since trade has more than doubled over the period, when 
either of these measures of disputes are cast in terms of the number of disputes relative to 
the amount of trade, that measure of the importance of disputes is declining.
25 
                                                 
23 Trade disputes provide a means of resolving differences of trade practices or policies deemed by one 
side to be contrary to agreed rules. However, often trade disputes arise from an effort by one industry to 
gain some private advantage over legitimate competition and prevent the working out of comparative 
advantage that lies elsewhere. There is a presumption in this paper that the costs of these disputes exceed 
their benefits, taken across all disputes. That is why many countries have introduced to more recent trade 
agreements improved provisions to resolve disputes more readily. The challenge is to reform rules to 
remove incentives for disputes advanced by an industry simply to protect it from competition from an 
industry in another country.  
24 This raises the question of what is unique within the agricultural sector that makes it so prone to trade 
disputes. One hypothesis is that the disputes are numerous because there are many small separate interests 
so counting the numbers of disputes is misleading and the share of trade affected by disputes is still small. 
A second hypothesis is that agricultural interests are used to special attentions from governments and see 
trade remedy as a continuation of subsidy and protection that they have come to expect. A third hypothesis 
is that, because farm subsidies are common, it is natural that countervail cases would be applied in 
agriculture.  
25 There are other measures that may be better indicators of the intensity or impact of trade disputes. One 
example of the latter would be the real value of trade that is involved in each dispute.   54 
When we look more closely at the disputes that have occurred bilaterally, there are 
several observations that stand out. First, most of the disputes are the outcome of what 
one might call ordinary competition for markets between the two countries. The 
overwhelming share of these disputes arises from increases in exports and the frictions 
that ensue from that in the importing country, with the importing country initiating the 
dispute. In a small number of cases, disputes arise from import impediments in the 
importing country, with the exporter initiating the dispute. When exports trigger the 
dispute (i.e., when the importer is the claimant) the dispute arises mostly in the form of 
trade remedy measures, primarily anti-dumping but with some countervail complaints. 
These disputes are mostly short term in nature in that they do not recur often. 
Furthermore, the anti-dumping complaints appear to show a tie with exchange rate 
changes, occurring more often when the importing country’s currency value appreciates.  
The other observation that arises from a review of specific bilateral agricultural disputes 
is that there are a small number of disputes that arise from major policy or institutional 
differences between Canada and the U.S. It may not be that the two policy frameworks 
are inherently incompatible but that the policy differences allow industry groups or 
companies in one jurisdiction to take advantage of those differences to impose costs on 
their competitors in the other country. These disputes are persistent, and may be triggered 
by an increase in exports or imports, but the underlying cause of the dispute is the 
difference in policies and institutions in the two countries. The two notable sectors are 
dairy and wheat, but the same problem arises periodically in sugar. In the disputes in 
these areas, positions are entrenched, and there is little evidence of willingness to 
compromise or change policies or institutions. In contrast to the many other dispute areas, 
dairy and wheat disputes seem far from a long term resolution, at least on a bilateral 
basis.  
Is there something that can be done in terms of Canadian policy or international (WTO) 
policy rules to reduce the prevalence of these disputes, assuming the disputes are 
undesirable? Solutions to the first class of disputes, those arising from ordinary 
competition plus an export/import surge, must involve reforms to the application of anti-
dumping rules, particularly the definition of dumping. The kind of change that is needed 
is to require some evidence of predatory behaviour on the part of exporters so that normal 
market circumstances in the agricultural sector would not readily trigger dumping 
investigations. In that sense, rules within a NAFTA could be based on domestic 
competition rules, where there are not provisions for dumping per se, but rather rules 
dealing with exercise of market power and predatory pricing. Lacking such multilateral 
institutional or rule changes, the only other avenue for reducing these disputes would 
seem to be for exporters to take some responsibility in limiting export surges into specific 
markets. This unilateral managed trade may be rational for individual exporting firms or 
industry groups, but it implies losses in the gains from trade that underlay free trade 
agreements. Given the existing trade remedy laws and their high probability of 
application to agricultural sector cases, plus the heavy transactions costs, legal and 
otherwise, of dealing with countervail and dumping cases, giving up these gains may 
represent an improvement for most exporters participants, but this outcome represents a 
major loss for the economies as a whole.    55 
On the wheat and dairy cases, one form of resolution would be a clear cut decision by 
trade remedy tribunals to forcefully reject cases that have no basis in economic logic and 
are more clearly attempts to simply protect an industry from competition. Given that 
these cases have reappeared regularly for decades, such outcomes seem unlikely without 
a change in the rules underlying dumping, countervail or safeguards. 
The other path to long-term resolution is greater policy harmonization. In the case of 
wheat, more details on acceptable behaviour for state trading enterprises is likely to be 
needed, as well as some limitation or removal of the domestic buying monopoly for 
wheat and barley. In the supply management area, the two primary areas of change would 
almost certainly have to be an expansion of tariff rate quota amounts, and/or a significant 
reduction in over-TRQ tariff levels so that they reduce but do not prohibit imports.  
These changes are most likely to occur only on a multilateral basis, such as in WTO 
negotiations. One should also anticipate that any significant changes in current 
institutions like those just mentioned would likely have to be worked out with the sector 
involved, and involve some demands for compensation. Finally, none of these changes 
are likely to occur easily or soon, given that the bulk of them require multilateral action 
and that progress generally comes about slowly in WTO negotiations. 
Despite the emphasis on trade disputes, the fact remains that most agricultural trade 
between Canada and the United States is unimpeded and clearly benefits people on both 
sides of the border. Farms and other firms are becoming progressively more North 
American in their operations and more and more expect to be able to do business with 
relatively little interference. 
The bottom line is that agricultural trade relations are strong, but could improve with a 
relatively few, but politically difficult reforms.  56
Annex A 
Table A.1: Detailed Table of Canadian/US Agricultural Trade Disputes 
 
This table (six landscape pages) is in Excel file “annex table revised 3-19-04.xls”  57 
 
Annex B. Legal Basis for Trade Remedy Cases 
This annex provides background material on two aspects of the bilateral relationship that 
may be helpful to elaborate on the institutional discussion above. These two aspects are 
the legal and institutional basis for anti-dumping and countervailing duties in Canada and 
the United States, and the set of administrative links that have been set up to improve the 
trade relationship. 
The legal and regulatory basis for CVD and AD trade remedy cases 
In both the United States and Canada the industries may raise concerns that unfair trade 
practices cause imports to enter and that they cause problems for affected domestic 
industries. Such cases proceed through elaborate legal channels following well-
established procedures. Rules in the United States and Canada are remarkably similar and 
the following is a rough sketch of the practices and rules in both countries.   
Anti-Dumping (AD) duties applied to counter sales below cost or sales below home 
market (or the exporter) prices (or a third market if home market data are not available or 
biased). Countervailing duties (CVD) applied to counter subsidies provided by the 
exporter government. 
In both types of cases two parallel issues must be considered. These are elaborate legal 
processes. In contested cases, both the domestic industry and the export industries are 
represented by legal counsel, economic consultants and other resources to help argue 
their cases at each step in the proceedings. In the CVD proceedings the exporter 
governments are also participants. In major contested cases it is not unusual for costs of 
the proceedings to run to millions of dollars for each side.  
Are there more than a de minimis amounts of dumping margin or subsidy applied to the 
exported products? If the finding is affirmative for dumping, then a dumping duty of 
countervailing duty is set equal to the difference between the actual export price and a 
hypothetical “fair value” export price that would obtain without dumping or subsidy. 
These calculations are the responsibility of a specified government agency, the 
Department of Commerce in the United States and the CFGC in Canada. The agency 
follows a set of definitions and rules to measure export prices and domestic prices, costs 
of production and subsidy rates. There is controversy about those rules and most 
economists would argue that the measurement process is fraught with difficulties and is 
prone to find affirmative dumping margins and subsidy. 
Has there been injury (or threat of injury) to the domestic industry producing a “like 
product” that competes with the imports? The injury determination is undertaken by a 
separate government agency, the International Trade Commission in the United States 
(USITC) and the International Trade Tribunal in Canada (CITT). These agencies 
determine if there is sufficient evidence to find that the domestic industry has been 
injured or in threatened with injury by reason of the “less than fair value” imports.    58 
Annex C: Canadian and US Institutions 
 






The purpose of the CCA is: 
1. To provide a high-level forum to strengthen bilateral agriculture trade relations 
between Canada and the United States through cooperation and coordination; 
2. To facilitate discussion and cooperation on matters related to agriculture 
between the two countries including, but not limited to: 
a. Agricultural trade and market access; 
b. Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) issues; 




The purpose of the PSAG is to provide a forum where producers and 
exporters, through their provincial and state governments, can raise bilateral 
agricultural trade issues. 
Canada – United States 
Free Trade Agreement 
(CUSTA/FTA) 
Binational Secretariat: 
Canadian and US 
Sections 
An administrative body similar to the NAFTA Secretariat that was integrated 
into the institutional structure of NAFTA. The Canadian and US national 
Sections became the NAFTA Canadian and United States national Sections. 
Trilateral 
North American Free 
Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) Secretariat 
The NAFTA Secretariat is comprised of three national sections representing 
the NAFTA signatory countries: the Canadian, Mexican, and US Sections. 
The NAFTA Secretariat administers the NAFTA dispute resolution processes 
under Chapters 14, 19 and 20 of the NAFTA and has certain responsibilities 
related to Chapter 11 dispute settlement provisions.  
North American Free 
Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) Commission 
The NAFTA Commission is a ministerial-level body that meets annually and 
is charged with supervising NAFTA’s implementation and ensuring its further 
development.  
North American Free 
Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) Committee 
on Agricultural Trade 
The Committee’s functions include:  
a) monitoring and promoting cooperation on the implementation and 
administration of Article 19;  
b) providing a forum for the Parties to consult on issues related to this Section 
at least semi-annually and as the Parties may otherwise agree; and  
c) reporting annually to the Commission on the implementation of this 
Section. 
The Advisory Committee on Private Commercial Disputes regarding 
Agricultural Goods, comprises persons with expertise or experience in the 
resolution of private commercial disputes in agricultural trade. The Advisory 
Committee reports and provides recommendations to the Committee for the 
development of systems in the territory of each Party to achieve the prompt and 
effective resolution of such disputes, taking into account any special 
circumstance, including the perishability of certain agricultural goods.  
North American Free 
Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) Committee 
The Committee facilitates:  
(a) enhancement of food safety and improvement of sanitary and phytosanitary 
conditions in the territories of the Parties;    59 
on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary 
Measures  
(b) activities of the Parties pursuant to Articles 713 and 714;  
(c) technical cooperation between the Parties, including cooperation in the 
development, application and enforcement of sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures; and  







The Committee monitors implementation of the commitments in country 
schedules. The review process is based on notifications by Members, the details 
of which will be determined by the Committee. The Committee receives detailed 
notification of any new support measure for which green category status is being 
claimed, and of any modification to a green program. 
General WTO dispute settlement provisions apply to disputes arising under 






The SPS Committee:  
•  Operates under the WTO SPS Agreement. 
•  Provides a regular forum for consultations within the WTO on all SPS 
issues. 
•  Facilitates the enhancement of food safety and sanitary conditions 
internationally, promote the harmonization and equivalence of SPS 
measures, and facilitate technical cooperation and consultations, 
including consultations regarding disputes involving SPS measures 
(Article 12) 
The provisions of GATT 1994 Articles XXII and XXIII as elaborated in the 
WTO Understanding on Dispute Settlement apply to consultations and the 
settlement of disputes. In a dispute under the SPS Agreement, a panel seeks 
advice from experts chosen by the panel in consultation with the parties to the 
dispute (Article 11). 
World Trade 
Organization (WTO) 
Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT) 
Committee 
Operates under the WTO TBT Agreement.  
Exists within the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a forum for 
consultations on all technical barrier to trade issues.  
Provides an opportunity to consult on any matter related to the operation of 
the Agreement or the furtherance of its objectives (Article 13). 
Any disagreements with respect to the operation of the Agreement take place 
under the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and follow the provisions of GATT 
1994 Articles XXII and XXIII as elaborated by the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. A dispute settlement panel 
may, either on its own initiative or at the request of a disputing party, establish 
and receive advice from technical experts (Article 14 and Annex 2). 
‘Quad’ Group   Quad Group Members: Canada, US, EU, Japan; the most prominent of the 
developed countries in the WTO. 
Quad Forum, a quarterly informal meeting of the Trade Ministers of Europe, 
Japan, Canada, and the United States. 
‘Quint’ Group  Quint Group Members: Australia, Canada, US, EU, Japan. 
The ‘Quint’ was formed in 1987 and met periodically during the Uruguay 
Round, but fell into disuse after the end of that Round in 1993. It was revived in 
the late 1990s.  
National: Canada 
Canadian Department 
of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade 
The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
negotiates and administers Canadian trade agreements and rules. 
Canadian International  CITT conducts inquiries into:   60 
Trade Tribunal (CITT)  •  whether dumped or subsidized imports have caused, or are threatening to 
cause, material injury to a domestic industry. 
•  complaints by potential suppliers concerning procurement by the federal 
government that is covered by the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, the Agreement on Internal Trade and the World Trade 
Organization Agreement on Government Procurement. 




CCRA promotes compliance with Canada's tax, trade, and border legislation, 
and regulations. 
The Customs and Trade Administration Branch is responsible for border 
services including the full range of facilitation, inspection, detention, collection, 
and enforcement activities at all ports of entry; trade policy administration 
including multilateral and regional trade policy agreements, other trade policy 
instruments, and duties relief programs. 
Agriculture and Agri-
Food Canada (AAFC) 
AAFC is the Canadian agricultural ministry. It oversees four agencies and two 
crown corporations: the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, the Canadian Grain 
Commission, The National Farm Products Council, the Review Tribunal, the 
Canadian Dairy Commission, and Farm Credit Canada.  
Canadian Grain 
Commission 
CGC is the Canadian federal department responsible for regulating Canadian 




The creation of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), in April 1997, 
brought together inspection and related services previously provided through the 
activities of four federal government departments – Agriculture and Agri-Food 
Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Health Canada and Industry Canada. The 
establishment of the CFIA consolidated the delivery of all federal food, animal 
and plant health inspection programs. 
The CFIA delivers 14 inspection programs related to foods, plants and 
animals in 18 regions across Canada. Their role is to enforce the food safety and 
nutritional quality standards established by Health Canada and, for animal health 
and plant protection, to set standards and carry out enforcement and inspection. 
Activities range from the inspection of federally-registered meat processing 
facilities to border inspections for foreign pests and diseases, to the enforcement 
of practices related to fraudulent labeling. They verify the humane transportation 
of animals, conduct food investigations and recalls, perform laboratory testing 




Under the Farm Products Agencies Act, the NFPC reviews the operations of 
(1) national agencies that run orderly marketing systems for poultry and eggs, 
and (2) promotion-research agencies.  
Under the Agricultural Products Marketing Act, the NFPC dovetails federal 
and provincial/territorial authority over farm product marketing granted to 
provincial commodity boards and commissions.  
Canadian Dairy 
Commission (CDC) 
CDC is a Crown corporation that plays a central facilitating role in the 
Canadian dairy industry. 
National: United States  
United States Trade 
Representative 
(USTR) 
USTR develops and implements US trade policies. 
United States 
International Trade 
USITC: determines whether the United States industry is materially injured by 
reason of the dumped or subsidized imports after a determination by the 
Commerce Department on whether the alleged subsidies or dumping are actually   61 
Commission (USITC)  occurring and, if so, at what levels.  
USITC makes determinations in investigations involving unfair practices in 
import trade. If it finds a violation of the law, the USITC may order the exclusion 




USDA is the US agricultural ministry. It oversees numerous agencies 
including the Farm Service Agency, the Foreign Agricultural Service, the Risk 
Management Agency, and the Food Safety Inspection Service. 
Foreign Agricultural 
Service (FAS) 
FAS bears the primary responsibility for USDA’s overseas activities -- market 
development, international trade agreements and negotiations, and the collection 
and analysis of statistics and market information. It also administers USDA's 
export credit guarantee and food aid programs.  
Food Safety Inspection 
Service (FSIS) 
FSIS: 
•  inspects all meat, poultry, and egg products sold in interstate commerce 
and re-inspects imported products, to confirm that they meet US food 
safety standards under the Federal Meat Inspection Act, the Poultry 
Products Inspection Act, and the Egg Products Inspection Act. 
•  sets requirements for meat and poultry labels and for certain slaughter and 
processing activities, such as plant sanitation and thermal processing.  
•  tests for microbiological, chemical, and other types of contamination and 
conducts epidemiological investigations in cooperation with the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 
•  conducts enforcement activities to address situations where unsafe, 
unwholesome, or inaccurately labeled products have been produced or 
marketed. 
•  maintains a comprehensive system of import inspection and controls.  
•  annually reviews inspection systems in all foreign countries eligible to 
export meat and poultry to the United States to ensure that they are 
equivalent to those under US laws.    62 
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